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NOTES
Thomasson v. Perry: Has the Fourth Circuit Taken "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" Too Literally?
Society has long treated the military as a separate community,
distanced from civilian society by its elusive ideals, rigid standards of
conduct, and unique duty to protect national security. Nevertheless,
the military and military schools are not immune from fundamental
changes in civilian society and, consequently, have been forced to
adjust their composition, structure and standards to accommodate
shifts in public opinion.2 The military's acceptance of these changes,
however, has neither been easy nor fast as racial minorities3 and
women4 attempt to carve a place for themselves in a community that
1. See generally James M. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen's ConstitutionalRights, 62 N.C. L. REV. 177 (1984) (discussing the
effect of the military's separation from common society on soldiers' constitutional rights).
2. The most recent example of how the military is being forced to change its policies
is on the education battleground, where women have begun to contest the right of state
funded military schools to exclude females from their programs in the name of tradition
and fraternity. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (challenging Virginia
Military Institute's exclusion of females under the Equal Protection Clause), on remand,
96 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 1996); Faulkner v. Jones, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir.) (challenging the
Citadel's gender-based exclusionary policies as violative of the Equal Protection Clause),
cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 331, and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995); David A. Kaplan,
VMIlBracesfor a Few Good Women, NEWSWEEK, July 8, 1996, at 72,72 (reporting on the
Supreme Court's invalidation of the Virginia Military Institute's policy barring admission
of females to the historically all-male school).
3. In addition to fighting segregation and racism in civilian society, AfricanAmericans have faced the battle of integration into the military. See, e.g., Maureen Harrington, Racism Was in Command, Military HistoriansDiscover,DENVER POST, June 16,
1996 (Magazine), at 16 (exposing the discrimination against and hatred of blacks during
World War II); Robert L. Jamieson, Jr., TrailblazingBlack Airmen Offer Kids a History
Lesson, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 1,1996, at A21 (recounting how AfricanAmericans in the Tuskegee military experiment overcame racist presumptions that they
lacked the intelligence to pilot fighter planes and went on to become some of the most
successful fighter pilots in the military).
4. While women now constitute a significant portion of the armed services, they still
face many obstacles, including sexual harassment and gender discrimination. See James
W. Crawley, Sex BarrierLurks Below the Surface: First Female SubmarinerIs Left High
and Dry, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July 22, 1995, at Al (discussing the military's
refusal to allow a female Lieutenant Commander to serve on an all-male submarine);
Jackie Spinner, Navy, Air Force to Review Explanation of Sexual HarassmentPolicy to
Personnel,WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1996, at A9 (recounting how the military's most recent
rape scandal has led the armed forces to investigate policies and conduct regarding sexual
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is often hostile to change and unwilling to deviate from tradition.
Recently, gays and lesbians5 have joined this fray by attempting to
carve out their niche in the largely homophobic community of the
military under the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy.6
President Clinton was principally responsible for bringing the issue of gay rights in the military to the forefront of social, military,
and judicial debate with his 1992 campaign promise to end the military's ban on homosexuals.7 Following his election, President Clinton
requested that Congress revamp the military's policy on discharging
gay service members. 8 After intensive investigations and debates by
harassment).
5. The terms "homosexual(s)" and "gay(s) and lesbian(s)" will be used interchangeably throughout this Note.
6. See Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915,951 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (Hall, J., dissenting)
("The evidence that prejudice against homosexuals is a purpose of 'don't ask, don't tell' is
therefore quite strong."), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 358 (1996); Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850
F. Supp. 910, 924 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (citing testimony "to the effect that the government's objection to homosexual service is based solely on the fears and prejudices of
heterosexual servicemembers"), appeal dismissed as moot and remanded, 97 F.3d 1235
(9th Cir. 1996). Over the past decade, gays and lesbians have found increasing acceptance as society has become more comfortable with homosexuality. This acceptance is
evidenced by the election of a significant number of openly gay public officials. See Joseph P. Shapiro et al., Straight Talk About Gays: Gay Rights Are Frontand Center as Bill
Clinton Moves to End the Military Ban on Homosexuals, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July
5, 1993, at 42, 44, 46, 48. Despite these strides, homosexuals still have many obstacles to
overcome. See id, at 47 (citing polls that indicate 52% of public schools refuse to include
issues of homosexuality in sex education curriculum); cf. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 929
(citing General Powell's testimony that admission of homosexuals into the military would
jeopardize the cohesion and combat readiness of fighting units).
7. See Walter John Krygowski, Comment, Homosexuality and the Military Mission:
The Failure of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Policy, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 875, 907
(1995). The media has acknowledged President Clinton as the first presidential candidate
to formally recognize homosexual issues, including the military ban on gays. See Derrick
Z. Jackson, Gay Democrats Wait and Hope, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 4, 1996, at A15. The
recognition paid off in 1992, as President Clinton received $3.5 million in gay campaign
contributions and 75% of the homosexual vote in the election. See id. President Clinton
was later criticized, however, for failing to promote the gay rights agenda. See Bob
Hohler & Jayson T. Blair, Gay Rights Movement FindsAgenda in Peril,BOSTON GLOBE,
July 8, 1996, at 1 (discussing the dissatisfaction among gays and lesbians with President
Clinton).
8. See President's Memorandum on Ending Discrimination in the Armed Forces, 1
PUB. PAPERS 23 (Jan. 29, 1993). The policy in effect in 1992 had been adopted in 1981.
See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (discussing the 1981 policy on discharging
homosexuals from the military). Commentators have described the 1981 policy on homosexuals as exclusionary because it barred homosexuals from entering the service and
required discharge of homosexuals in the armed forces. See Melissa Wells-Petry, Sneaking a Wink at Homosexuals? Three Case Studies on Policies ConcerningHomosexuality in
the United States Armed Forces, 64 UMKC L. REV. 3, 5 (1995). While the "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy was being drafted, an interim policy was instituted that allowed openly
gay soldiers to remain in standby reserve, "separated from active duty," and required
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both House and Senate congressional committees, Congress passed
10 U.S.C. § 654, commonly known as the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy on gays in the military.9 Under the new policy, any service
member who (1) engages in or attempts to engage in a homosexual
act; (2) states they are homosexual; or (3) has married or attempted
to marry someone of the same sex will be separated' and discharged,
provided they cannot rebut the presumption that they have a
"propensity" or intention to engage in homosexual conduct." The
Department of Defense subsequently issued regulations in response
to §654 in the form of Department of Defense (DOD) Directives
(the "regulations").
Litigation over the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy followed, 3 as
gay service members who thought they were free to reveal their homosexuality found themselves unexpectedly discharged. '4 As a
them to refrain from homosexual conduct until further review could take place under the
new policy. See President's News Conference on Gays in the Military, 29 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 109 (Jan. 29, 1993).
9. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103160, § 571(a)(1), 107 Stat. 1547 (1993) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994)). Before setting
forth the restrictions on the military's ability to discharge gays and lesbians, the statute
lists the congressional findings that influenced the parameters of the statute; these factors
include the need to preserve unit cohesion in the armed forces, maintain the uniqueness
of military life, and prohibit homosexuality in the military. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(6), (7),
(13), (14).
10 "Separation" is defined as a "general term which includes discharge, [or] release
from active duty." 32 C.F.R. § 41.6(d) (1995).
11. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1)-(3); see also infra notes 232-39 and accompanying text
(debating the ability of gays and lesbians to rebut the presumption of homosexuality).
The statute has a much narrower scope than the policy proposed by President Clinton,
which would have allowed homosexuals to openly serve in the military without the risk of
discharge. Compare § 654(b) (setting forth the current "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy),
with President's Memorandum on Ending Discrimination in the Armed Forces, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 23 (Jan. 29, 1993) (outlining President Clinton's agenda for gays and lesbians in
the military).
12. See 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A (1995). A great deal of the judicial controversy over
the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy stems from discrepancies between the statute and the
regulations. See infra notes 94-110 and accompanying text (outlining the differences between the statute and the regulations).
13. The most litigated term of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy is 10 U.S.C.
§ 654(b)(2), which bases discharge from military service on a presumption that a gay
service member will engage in homosexual conduct once the individual declares his or her
homosexuality. See, e.g., Watson v. Perry, 918 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
For purposes of this Note, 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) will be referred to as the "statements"
provision.
14. Consequently, the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy was widely criticized as even
more prejudicial than the prior one. See 'Don'tAsk Don't Tell' Policy a 'Travesty,' USA
TODAY, Jan. 25, 1995, at 8D (citing the views of Lt. Colonel Cammermeyer, a discharged
lesbian Army nurse, that the policy is prejudicial); Lift the Ban (U.S. Military "Don'tAsk,
Don't Tell" Gay Policy Ineffective), NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 27, 1995, at 7, 7 (criticizing
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result, the courts have been called upon to closely compare the statute with the regulations in an attempt to determine the
constitutionality of separating soldiers based solely on their declarations of homosexuality.
However, the courts have struggled to
reconcile the scope of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy with the
constitutional rights of gay service members." One of the most recent additions to the judicial debate on homosexuals in the military is
Thomasson v. Peny, the first Fourth Circuit case to examine the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy since its enactment in 1994.
A nine-to-four en banc decision upholding the constitutionality
of the policy, Thomasson represents the extremes of judicial interpretation of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." The majority attempted to
terminate the increasing distortion of the policy's parameters by
heavily emphasizing judicial deference to military judgment. 8 The
concurrence devoted its opinion to exposing the discrepancies between the regulations and 10 U.S.C. § 654. 9 Finally, the dissent
voiced the growing concern that the judiciary is shirking its duty to
uphold the Constitution by allowing the military to foster its prejudices against homosexuals under the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy. 2 The majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in ThoPresident Clinton for compromising on the policy); Eric Schmitt, "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell"
Policy Is Misused, Gays in Military Say, HOUSTON CHRON., May 22, 1994, at 12 (noting
that most gay service members feel the policy has made their situations worse, further
polarizing attitudes toward homosexuality).
15. See Thorne v. United States Dep't of Defense, 916 F. Supp. 1358, 1366 (E.D. Va.
1996), opinion supplemented by 945 F. Supp. 924, 926 (E.D. Va. 1996) (mem.). But cf.
Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 934-35 (Luttig, J., concurring) (stating that the statute is
valid on its own, without regard to the regulations).
16. Compare Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 920 F. Supp. 1510, 1534, 1536
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy violated the officer's First
Amendment rights as well as the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment),
with Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 931-34 (holding the policy did not infringe upon Thomasson's
First or Fifth Amendment rights).
17. 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 358 (1996). The Supreme
Court has never directly addressed the issue of homosexuals in the military, though the
Court has ruled on the constitutional rights of homosexuals in the criminal context, see
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986) (upholding a state statute criminalizing
sodomy), as well as certain constitutional rights of soldiers, see Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1986) (holding the military did not infringe on a service member's
free exercise rights by forbidding him from wearing a yarmulke while on duty).
1& See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 921-31; infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text. The
majority upheld the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy as constitutional under the First and
Fifth Amendments when the military discharged Thomasson following his announcement
that he was gay. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 934.
19. See id, at 934-49 (Luttig, J., concurring) (discussing the meaning of "propensity"
under the statute and under the regulations); infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
20. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 949-54 (Hall, J., dissenting); infra notes 61-71 and ac-
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masson not only recapitulate the major aspects of the debate over
homosexuals in the military, but also reveal the potential for a multitude of judicial interpretations of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy.
This Note begins by reviewing the background of Thomasson, as
well as the reasoning and conclusions of the majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions. 1 This overview is followed by a history of the
military policies on homosexualiV and an examination of the current
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. The Note then examines judicial
decisions leading up to Thomasson, including those cases decided before the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy went into effect, with an
emphasis on equal protection and First Amendment challenges to the
policy.' 3 Next, the Note reviews the Thomasson majority's willingness to defer to the legislature and the military, and the effect of this
deference on the outcome of the case.24 The Note then investigates
the concurrence's exposure of the discrepancies between 10 U.S.C.
§ 654(b) and the regulations with regard to the definition of
"propensity" to engage in homosexual conduct and analyzes the effect of those discrepancies on the constitutional review of the
military's policy on homosexuals in Thomasson.25 Finally, the Note
highlights the public policy concerns of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" and
concludes with a prediction as to the judicial and practical future of
the policy.!
Lieutenant Paul G. Thomasson was an outstanding naval officer
throughout his ten-year military career. 27 He was selected to serve as
an intern for the Joint Chiefs of Staff where he worked with General
Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, receiving a
medal for his "'superlative performance.' "28 He repeatedly ranked

companying text; cf.Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 915-16 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(expressing concern over granting too much judicial deference in military matters), appeal
dismissed as moot and remanded,97 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1996).
21. See infra notes 27-71 and accompanying text.

22. See infra notes 72-116 and accompanying text.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See infra notes 117-248 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 249-309 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 310-36 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 337-56 and accompanying text.
See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 920.

28. Id. at 950 (Hall, J., dissenting). General Powell expressly praised Lt. Thomasson
for his outstanding work during his internship with the Pentagon. See id. (Hall, J., dissenting). Ironically, it was General Powell who testified in the Senate hearings on the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy that "the presence of open homosexuality would have an
unacceptable detrimental and disruptive impact on the cohesion, morale, and esprit of the
armed forces." S. REP. No. 103-112, at 278 (1993).
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at the top of his class,29 and was described by one of his superiors as
"'a super star-one of the Navy's future leaders.' ,30 In 1994, following the implementation of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy,
Lieutenant Thomasson informed several of his commanding officers
of his homosexuality, writing," 'the time has come when I can remain
silent no longer ...I am gay.' ,31 The Navy subsequently discharged
Thomasson pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2), which mandates the
separation and discharge of any "member [stating2 that he or she is a
homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect." The Navy Board
of Inquiry concluded that Thomasson's announcement of his homosexuality invoked the presumption that he had a "propensity" to
engage in homosexual acts. 3 The board further concluded that Thomasson had failed to rebut the presumption by proving that he was
"not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity
to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts." ' Thus, the
29. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 920; id,at 950 (Hall, J., dissenting). Thomasson's
commanders recognized that he consistently "outperform[ed]" many of his peers. See id,
at 950 n.4 (Hall, J., dissenting) (citing Commander T.M. Feeks).
30. Id.(Hall, J., dissenting) (quoting Rear Admiral Alexander Krekich).
31. Id.at 920 (quoting the letter Thomasson presented to his superiors). Gay and
lesbian officers have a variety of reasons for admitting their homosexuality. See, e.g.,
Watson v. Perry, 918 F. Supp. 1403, 1408 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (lieutenant admitted his
homosexuality out of personal honesty and integrity, as well as a hope to eliminate
blackmail threats from his peers); Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260, 263 (D. Md. 1995)
(officer formally announced his homosexuality after being ridiculed by fellow crew members and confiding in the Navy chaplain), affd, 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam);
Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 912-13 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (lieutenant colonel
responded she was a lesbian when asked about her sexuality in a top secret clearance
interview for entrance into the Army War College), appeal dismissed as moot and remanded, 97 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1996). For a discussion of the impact the exact wording of
the admission can have on the validity of the discharge, see infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
32. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (1994); see Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 920-21. The policy also
directs the discharge of homosexual service members who have "engaged in, attempted to
engage in, or solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts" or who have
"married or attempted to marry a person known to be of the same biological sex."
§ 654(b)(1), (3). However, the cases in this Note focus solely on the statements provision,
§ 654(b)(2). See supra note 13.
33. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 921. As reflected by Judge Luttig's lengthy concurrence, the definition of "propensity" to engage in homosexual acts is at the core of many
judicial debates regarding the constitutionality of the statute and the regulations. See id.
at 934-49 (Luttig, J., concurring) (discussing the implications of inconsistent definitions of
"propensity" on the outcome of suits contesting the constitutionality of the policy); see
also infra notes 85-93, 104-10 and accompanying text (citing cases that highlight the debate over the different interpretations of the term "propensity").
34. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2); see Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 921; see also Watson, 918 F.
Supp. at 1409 (listing the factors to consider in determining whether the service member
has effectively rebutted the presumption of homosexuality under the statute). Service
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engage in
policy directed that the Navy presume Thomasson would him.
discharge
and
statement,
his
on
based
homosexual conduct
Thomasson subsequently brought an action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent his termination based solely on
his statement of homosexuality. 36 In his claim, Thomasson challenged
the statute under the First and Fifth Amendments, asserting that the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy was unconstitutional both on its face
and as applied to him?3 The district court rejected his claims, holding
that the statute did not violate the First or Fifth Amendments, either
facially or as applied to him.3' Thomasson then appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which heard the appeal en
banc.39
members who are presumed homosexuals can rebut the presumption by proving the following:
(A) such conduct is a departure from the member's usual and customary behavior;
(B) such conduct, under all the circumstances, is unlikely to recur;
(C) such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or intimidation;
(D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the member's continued
presence in the armed forces is consistent with the interests of the armed forces
in proper discipline, good order, and morale; and
(E) the member does not have a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual
acts.
10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1)(A)-(E). There is no rebuttable presumption for those homosexuals
who are married to a same-sex spouse, or have attempted such a marriage. See id.
§ 654(b)(3).
35. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 920-21 (indicating that the Navy Board of Inquiry
relied on both the statute and the regulations to presume that Thomasson's admission
warranted separation); see also 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (the "statements" provision).
36. See Thomasson v. Perry, 895 F. Supp. 820,821 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff'd, 80 F.3d 915
(4th Cir.) (en banc), cerL denied, 117 S. Ct. 358 (1996).
37. See id. Though the Fifth Amendment does not contain an explicit Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court has read an equal protection aspect into the Amendment.
See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954). Thomasson claimed that the statute
violated this equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. See ia. Thomasson
also challenged the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy as an infringement on due process and
procedural fairness and the Administrative Procedure Act, based on (1) the irrationality
of presuming homosexual conduct from statements; (2) a claim that the presumption is
irrebuttable; and (3) a claim that the discharge was arbitrary and capricious. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 934. The court found no merit in any of these claims based on the
conclusions it derived from the equal protection and freedom of speech analyses. See id.;
see also infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text (setting forth the court's analysis of each
constitutional issue).
38. See Thomasson v. Perry, 895 F. Supp. 820,831 (E.D. Va. 1995), affd, 80 F.3d 915
(4th Cir.) (en banc), cerL denied, 117 S. Ct. 358 (1996).
39. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 921. A panel of the court initially heard arguments on
Thomasson's appeal in September of 1995. See id. Subsequently, the full Fourth Circuit
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Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Wilkinson opened the
opinion with a comprehensive historical review of the "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy, both from a political and a legislative standpoint.4
In his account of the statute's background, he emphasized the extensive and rigorous review conducted by both the Senate and the
House Armed Services Committees, as well as investigations conducted by the Department of Defense.41 Based on these "exhaustive
efforts of the democratically accountable branches of American government" in structuring the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, the court
concluded that the executive and legislative conclusions regarding the
validity of the statute merited substantial judicial deference.4 The
majority's deference was also heightened due to the long-standing
judicial tradition of according such deference when "'legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies
and make rules and regulations for their governance is challenged.' "43 Furthermore, the court specifically cited its relative
ignorance of the unique needs of military life, the greater societal acceptance of military policies issued by the politically accountable
branches of government, and the Supreme Court's repeated emphasis
on judicial restraint with regard to military judgments." The Thovoted to hear the case en bane. See id.
40. See id. at 921-23. Chief Judge Wilkinson's majority opinion was joined by Judges
Russell, Widener, Murnaghan, Wilkins, Niemeyer, Hamilton, Luttig, and Williams. Judge
Luttig, also writing separately in concurrence, conducted a similar review. See id at 93537 (Luttig, J., concurring).
41. See id. at 921-23. The investigation of the policy was conducted over the course
of seven months, following President Clinton's request that the Secretary of Defense draft
an Executive Order ending discrimination against service members based on their sexuality. See id. at 921-22; President's Memorandum on Ending Discrimination in the Armed
Forces, 1 PUB. PAPERS 23 (Jan. 29, 1993). During their investigation, both houses considered various versions of the proposal to eliminate discrimination based on sexual
orientation; the proposals ranged from giving free reign to the President and the military
to create an appropriate policy to maintaining the old policy of asking recruits about their
sexuality. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 923; see also 139 CONG. REc. H7084-86 (daily ed.
Sept. 28, 1993) (recounting the debate over Congressman Hunter's proposed amendment
to the policy); 139 CONG. REC.H7080-84 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1993) ("Sense of Congress
Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces"); 139 CONG. REC. S11168-11228 (daily
ed. Sept. 9, 1993) (detailing the Senate debate over gays in the military).
42. Thoinasson, 80 F.3d at 923. For a discussion the court's willingness to shape its
opinion by deference to military judgment, see infra notes 249-309 and accompanying
text.
43. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 925 (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57,70 (1981)).
44. See id. at 925-26. Among the Supreme Court decisions noted by the Thomasson
court for their judicial deference to the military were Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503, 507 (1986) (emphasizing the need for conformity in upholding the military policy of
prohibiting the wearing of religious accouterments), and Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348,
356-57 (1980) (recognizing the potentially disturbing effect of a soldier's distribution of

1997]

"DON'TASK,DON'T TELL"

masson court also looked to the text of the Constitution, interpreting
the absence of constitutional provisions directing the courts to participate in military activities as additional support for its deferential
position on military matters.45
Having established its deference to military policies, the court
proceeded to analyze Thomasson's constitutional claims by first determining whether the statute violates the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment. 4' The Fourth Circuit rejected
Thomasson's argument seeking heightened scrutiny for his claim,
concluding that gays do not constitute a suspect class for equal protection purposes, nor does the statute infringe on a fundamental
right.47 Instead, the court concluded that rational basis review is the
appropriate standard under which to examine military discrimination
against homosexuals. 4' The Fourth Circuit then found that the statute is rationally related to the government's legitimate interest in
preventing the disruption of unit cohesion and combat readiness, and
that it permissibly requires soldiers to be discharged based on actions
which might interfere with this cohesion.49
political flyers in a unit, even though such a restriction might violate free speech in the
civilian world).
45. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 924. The Constitution exclusively grants military powers to the executive and legislative branches. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating the
military powers reserved for Congress); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (stating the military responsibilities of the President).
46. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 927-31.
47. See id, at 927-28. There are two methods of invoking heightened scrutiny. First, a
plaintiff can claim that he or she is subject to a discriminatory governmental classification
based on some trait, e.g., race, that is particular to a certain group of people; this will afford the plaintiff heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. See City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); infra note 130. Alternatively, a plaintiff can invoke heightened scrutiny by asserting that he or she has a
fundamental constitutional right to engage in certain activities or to be free from governmental interference. Fundamental rights have been asserted under both the Equal
Protection Clause, see, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reL Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) (finding a fundamental right to procreate), or under substantive due process, see,
e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding that the fundamental
right to privacy extends to decisions about contraception). But see San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-39 (1973) (finding that there is no fundamental
constitutional right to education beyond ensuring the "basic minimal skills necessary for
the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political process").
48. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d. at 927-28; cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96
(1986) (finding the fundamental right to privacy does not encompass consensual homosexual sodomy). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia also
applied the rational basis standard. See Thomasson v. Perry, 895 F. Supp. 820, 827 (E.D.
Va. 1995), affd, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 358 (1996). For a
review of the three standards of equal protection review, see infra note 130.
49. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 928-31; see also 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1)-(15) (1994)
(listing the policy considerations supporting the statute).
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The court next considered the policy's alleged unconstitutional
infringement on Thomasson's First Amendment right to state that he
is gay without being punished for doing so.* Heavily influenced by
the military's contention that it only used this speech as evidence of a
soldier's "propensity" toward homosexuality, the majority concluded
that soldiers are not dismissed merely because they articulate that
they are gay.5 ' The fact that the policy allows soldiers to freely discuss homosexuality- and affiliate with gay groups further supports the
contention that the statute is not per se aimed at suppressing the free
speech of soldiers. 2 Consequently, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit concluded that the statute is content-neutral, since it
primarily focuses on limiting conduct that is potentially disruptive to
the performance of the military rather than on curtailing speech
about homosexuality. 3 Hence, the court upheld the district court's
conclusion that the statute does not violate the First Amendment.5
The majority's decision was followed by a lengthy concurrence
by Judge Luttig, which detailed the discrepancies between the statute
and the regulations in defining a soldier's "propensity" to engage in
50. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 931-34. As the other two grounds for dismissal are not
specifically directed at a soldier's statements, only those soldiers discharged for articulating their homosexuality can contend the policy violates their First Amendment rights.
Compare 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1), (3) (discharging homosexual soldiers either for general
homosexual conduct or homosexual marriage), with 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (discharging
service members who proclaim their homosexuality and invoke the presumption of their
"propensity" to engage in homosexual conduct).
51. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 931. It is well established that using speech as evidence is constitutional. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-78 (1968); accord
Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260,264 (D. Md. 1995) (finding merit in the argument that a
soldier's homosexual speech was used solely for evidentiary purposes), affd, 100 F.3d 950
(4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
52. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 932; accord Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1163 (9th
Cir. 1991) (opinion amended May 8, 1992); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 462 (7th
Cir. 1989); Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 928-29 (W.D. Wash. 1994), appeal
dismissed as moot and remanded,97 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1996).
53. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 932-33. But see Thorne v. United States Dep't of Defense, 916 F. Supp. 1358, 1368 (E.D. Va. 1996) (finding the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy to be a content-based restriction), opinion supplemented by 945 F. Supp. 924, 926
(E.D. Va. 1996) (mem.). A regulation is considered content-neutral, as opposed to content-based, when it targets something other than the content of speech. See Thomasson,
80 F.3d at 933 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (upholding
a regulation of speech based on its volume, not its content)).
54. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 933-34. After rejecting Thomasson's First and Fifth
Amendment claims, the majority concluded with a perfunctory denial of Thomasson's due
process claims and his claims based on the Administrative Procedure Act, merely referring to the rationales used in the First and Fifth Amendment analyses. See id. at 934.
Specifically, the court referred to its earlier discussion regarding the rationality of the
statute's rebuttable presumption of homosexual propensities. See id.
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homosexual acts.55 Judge Luttig declared that the regulations should
be

invalidated,

since

the

Department

of

Defense

defined

"propensity" as a "likelihood," rather than utilizing the term's literal
definition of orientation or "inclination"; he thus argued that the Department acted "in excess of its statutory authority" by materially
altering the scope of § 654.56 Judge Luttig further argued that in narrowing the scope of the policy to reach only those likely to engage in
homosexual acts, the Department of Defense favored gays by lowering the standard of proof required to rebut the presumption of
homosexuality and "'create[d] ...a sanctuary in the military.' "57
According to Judge Luttig, this sanctuary allows service members to
remain in the armed forces merely by recanting their statements of
homosexuality and proving they are not likely to engage in homosexual activities.58 Conversely, if "propensity" is defined as an
"inclination" or orientation, as Judge Luttig argued Congress intended, the discharge of gay and lesbian soldiers would be
significantly more probable due to the near impossibility of disprov55. See id. at 934-35 (Luttig, J.,
concurring). Judges Russell, Widener, Wilkins, Hamilton, and Williams joined in the concurrence. See id.at 949 (Luttig, J.,concurring).
Judge Murnaghan also wrote a brief concurrence, arguing that the majority should have
narrowed the focus of its opinion to the validity of the rebuttable presumption. See id.at
934 (Murnaghan, J.,
concurring).
56. See id. at 935, 942-43 (Luttig, J., concurring). The statute fails to clearly define
"propensity" and, consequently, the Fourth Circuit is not the first court to be troubled by
the discrepancy between the regulatory definition and the dictionary definition of
"propensity." See, e.g., infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text. In substituting
"propensity" for the old policy's term "desire," some argue that Congress did not intend
for the revision to substantially change the effect of the policy. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at
944 (Luttig, J., concurring) (citing S. REP.No. 103-112, at 289-90 (1993)).
57. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 943 (Luttig, J.,concurring) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
103-200, at 289 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2013, 2076). The discrepancies
between the two definitions of "propensity" have a significant impact on a service member's ability to rebut the presumption of homosexuality. See id. at 942 (Luttig, J.,
concurring). Judge Luttig referred to prior occasions when the Administration allegedly
distorted the statute to imply homosexuals would only be discharged if they were likely to
engage in homosexual acts. See id.at 940-41 (Luttig, J.,
concurring). He cited the Administration's incorrect portrayal of General Colin Powell's congressional testimony as
indicating that persons who were likely to engage in homosexual conduct would disrupt
unit cohesion, when General Powell actually stated that " 'open homosexuality'" would
have a negative impact on the unit. See id. at 940 (Luttig, J.,
concurring); S. REP.No.
103-112, at 278 (1993). Judge Luttig also claimed the Administration had misrepresented
General Schwarzkopf's testimony on homosexuals, and had varied the definition of
"propensity" to accommodate the political interests of different audiences. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 94041 (Luttig, 3., concurring).
58. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 941 (Luttig, J.,
concurring); cf.Thorne v. United States
Dep't of Defense, 916 F. Supp. 1358, 1364-65 (E.D. Va. 1996) (finding the statute to be a
tautology, because the only means to rebut the presumption under the statute would be to
recant), opinion supplemented by 945 F. Supp. 924, 926 (E.D. Va. 1996) (mem.).
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ing an orientation. 9 Judge Luttig closed his concurrence by reiterating that Congress's intended definition of "propensity" survives
rational basis review, because dismissing gay service members is rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest in preserving
unit cohesion.'
In dissent, Judge Hall expressed strong disapproval of the majority's excessive deference to the military's judgment that
homosexuals are a threat to unit cohesiveness." Judge Hall reminded
the court that "the military remains submissive to the Constitution
and civil authority."6 2 He also voiced concerns over the military's
ability to discharge outstanding officers, such as Lieutenant Thomasson, under the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy merely for announcing
they are gay.63 He consequently devoted his opinion to exposing the
prejudices that fueled the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, and attacked the over-inflated importance of unit cohesion in the military
and the irrational fear that gay soldiers would undermine the effectiveness of the unit.64
Judge Hall argued that the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy is irrational and a violation of the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment, claiming there is no merit to the conclusion by the
military and Congress that the presence of open homosexuals threatens unit cohesion.6 He referred to three flaws in the unit cohesion
59. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 943 (Luttig, J.,concurring). Judge Luttig contended
that Congress intended to bar the admission and retention of gay and lesbian soldiers
because their admission and retention would be "'inimical to unit cohesion, morale, welfare and discipline.'" Id. (Luttig, J., concurring) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-200, at 289
(1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2013,2076).
60. See id. at 946-48 (Luttig, J., concurring); see also Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d
454,461 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[A]ccepting admitted homosexuals into the armed forces might
imperil morale, discipline, and the effectiveness of our fighting forces.").
61. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 949-54 (Hall, J., dissenting). Judges Ervin, Michael,
and Motz joined Judge Hall's dissent. See id. at 954 (Hall, J.,
dissenting).
62. Id. at 949 (Hall, 3., dissenting). Judge Hall warned that yielding too much constitutional latitude to the military in its policies "could transform the military into a
domestic danger." Id. (Hall, J., dissenting). Judge Hall is not alone in his concerns. In
Holmes v. CaliforniaArmy National Guard,920 F. Supp. 1510 (N.D. Cal. 1996), a federal
district court refused to grant the military absolute power to determine the scope of its
policies, stating that a very real danger exists in allowing unchecked deference to the
armed forces. See id. at 1533 n.25.
63. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 950-51 (Hall, J.,
dissenting); see also Cammermeyer v.
Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 915, 924-26 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (finding that the policy is driven
by the prejudices of the armed forces, and stating that prejudice or bias is not an acceptable rational basis in support of a governmental policy), appeal dismissed as moot and
remanded,97 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1996).
64. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 951-53 (Hall, J., dissenting).
65. See id. (Hall, J.,
dissenting); see also Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 923 (citing a
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argument asserted by the military: foremost, it reflects the military's
lack of confidence in the ability of its soldiers to remain fixed on their
duties;6 second, it allows the prejudices of society to influence the
military's discrimination against selected members in the service;6
and finally, there is a substantial lack of evidence that gays and lesbians cause a disintegration of unit morale and confidence.6
Therefore, Judge Hall concluded that the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy violates even a rational basis test under the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment because it is used to foster
prejudice, an interest which has never been considered legitimate.6 9
Judge Hall also found the policy to be unconstitutional under the
First Amendment because it results in the discharge of soldiers based
solely on the content of their statements. 70 He concluded his dissent
by reflecting that "Lt. Paul Thomasson has been declared unfit to defend our country based on nothing more than an expression of his
RAND Report that found the government's assertion that admitted gays posed a threat
to unit cohesion to be strictly speculative). Judge Hall also refuted the rationale that
discharging admitted gays would indirectly further the "bonds of trust." Thomasson, 80
F.3d at 953 (Hall, J.,
dissenting).
66. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 951 (Hall, J.,
dissenting) (citing Dr. Lawrence J. Korb,
Assistant Secretary of Defense under President Reagan). The dissent claimed that the
policy irrationally assumed admitted homosexuals were unable to restrain themselves
from engaging in homosexual conduct. See id. (Hall, J., dissenting).
67. See irL (Hall, 3., dissenting); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (setting forth the fundamental principle that discrimination
against a part of a whole is not constitutionally acceptable). Judge Hall noted that the
military at one time perceived race as a threat to unit cohesion, but ultimately recognized
that these fears were baseless; thus, Judge Hall argued that the military should learn from
its past experience and accept homosexuality within its ranks. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at
952-53 (Hall, J.,
dissenting). But see id at 928 (citing General Powell's testimony distinguishing racial discrimination from discrimination against homosexuals).
68. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d. at 951-52 (Hall, J., dissenting) (quoting Dr. Lawrence .
Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense under President Reagan); see also Thorne v. United
States Dep't of Defense, 916 F. Supp. 1358, 1363 (E.D. Va. 1996) (finding that the cohesion and morale of the unit did not deteriorate when the military reinstated an openly gay
officer during the implementation of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy), opinion supplemented by 945 F. Supp. 924, 926 (E.D. Va. 1996) (mem.); Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp.
at 919 (citing data that there is no evidence homosexuals are less likely than heterosexuals to control their sexual urges).
69. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 951 (Hall, J., dissenting); see also Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (finding prejudice to be an illegitimate reason to uphold a policy). Because fundamentally prejudicial policies are unconstitutional regardless of the
classification of the group, Judge Hall did not need to determine whether homosexuals
constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 951 (Hall, J.,
dissenting).
70. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 954 (Hall, J.,
dissenting). The fact that the restriction
was content-based also provided further support for Judge Hall's contention that the policy was motivated by the unconstitutional justification of prejudice. See id.(Hall, J.,
dissenting).
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state of mind"; according to Judge Hall, the senseless loss of such an
outstanding soldier is even more detrimental to the efficacy of the
military than the alleged problems associated with the retention of
admitted homosexuals 7'
Given that the armed forces have unofficially excluded homosexuals in one form or another since 1778, Lieutenant Thomasson is
far from the first gay soldier to be affected by a military policy on
homosexuality.' Throughout its history, the military has used a variety of methods to exclude gays and lesbians, ranging from classifyin9
homosexuality as a crime to considering it a psychological disease.
The military first issued an official set of regulations prohibiting homosexuality in the armed forces during World War II, barring the
service of soldiers who had engaged in homosexual acts.74 After the
conclusion of World War II, the Department of Defense was created,
and it attempted to standardize the policies on homosexuality among
the military branches by issuing a policy to serve as a model for each
branch.75 However, the Department of Defense largely failed in its
first attempt to regulate homosexual discharge policies, since it still
afforded each branch substantial discretion in formulating its own
policy, thereby resulting in conflicting policies among the branches.76
71. See id (Hall, J., dissenting). The dissent also found the policy to violate the due
process rights of Lt. Thomasson, because the policy unconstitutionally presumed misconduct based on actual or perceived status. See id. at 953 (Hall, J., dissenting).
72. See Kenneth Williams, Gays in the Military: The Legal Issues, 28 U.S.F. L. REv.
919, 920 (1994). Between 1950 and 1987, the military appears to have discharged approximately 70,000 gay and lesbian service members based on their homosexuality. See
Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual OrientationLaw in the Mid-Eighties,Part II, 11 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 275, 323 (1986).
73. See Judith Hicks Stiehm, Managing the Military's Homosexual Exclusion Policy:
Text and Subtext, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 685, 688-89 (1992).
74. See Jeanne M. VanderHeide, Comment, Is "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Constitutional? Legislative and JudicialReform of the Military's Ban on Gay Men and Lesbians,
40 WAYNE L. REv. 1273, 1277 (1994). The military's policy of excluding homosexuals
may have been even broader absent a shortage of soldiers in World War II. See generally
ALLAN BARUBA, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN

INWORLD WAR Two 8-33 (1990) (discussing the role of homosexuals in World War II).
75. See Krygowski, supra note 7, at 880-86; see also Major Jeffrey S. Davis, Military
Policy Toward Homosexuals: Scientific, Historical and Legal Perspectives, 131 MIL. L.
REv. 55,75-79 (1991) (discussing the respective policies for each branch). All of the military branches are subject to Department of Defense regulations. See 32 C.F.R. §41.2
(1981) ("The provisions of this part apply to the Regular and Reserve components of the
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and, by agreement with the Secretary of Transportation, to the Coast Guard.").
76. See 139 CONG. REc. S755 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Nunn)
(discussing the evolution of the regulations on homosexuality in the military during a
speech advocating the exclusion of homosexual soldiers).
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In 1981, the Department of Defense tried once again to establish
a unified military policy on gays and lesbians by issuing DOD Directive 1332.14 (the "1981 policy"), which updated the military's general
separation policies and explicitly emphasized that "[h]omosexuality is
incompatible with military service." The Department of Defense
justified the exclusion of gays and lesbians from the military by
claiming that the presence of gay soldiers would be detrimental to the
morale and order of the unit, threaten the bonds of trust between the
soldiers, and jeopardize the integrity of the military hierarchy. 78 Under the 1981 policy, service members were separated if (1) they
participated in, attempted to participate in, or solicited to participate
in homosexual conduct; (2) they stated they were gay; or (3) they attempted to marry or married another member of the same sex.79
Each of the three categories was rebuttable; for example, a soldier
could rebut the presumption derived from an articulation of homosexuality by showing that he or she does not participate, desire to
participate or intend to participate in homosexual acts.8° The Department of Defense subsequently clarified Directive 1332.14 from
time to time, but the core principle-that gays who desired or intended to commit homosexual acts were not compatible with military
service-remained."
While the 1981 policy achieved its purpose of creating a unitary
military separation policy, the policy proved to be ambiguous in its

77. DOD Directive 1332.14, 32 C.F.R. § 41.13(a) (1981), superseded by 10 U.S.C.
§ 654 (1994); DOD Directive 1332.14 (1994); see also 32 C.F.R. § 41.2 (setting forth the
basis for the applicability of the regulations to the various military branches). A homosexual is defined by the regulation as "a person, regardless of sex, who engages in, desires
to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts." Id. § 41.13(b)(1).
78. See 32 C.F.R. § 41.13(a). The 1981 policy also cited the maintenance of "public
acceptability of military service" as an additional reason to separate homosexuals. See id.
Interestingly, that rationale is absent from the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy's enumerated reasons for separation of homosexuals. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1994) (listing
Congress's justifications for separating homosexuals from the military).
79. See 32 C.F.R. § 41.13(c)(1)-(3). Thus, the 1981 policy failed to distinguish between conduct and status. See Wells-Petry, supra note 8, at 17.
80. See 32 C.F.R. § 41.13(b)(1), (c)(2). Some courts interpreted the term "desire" to
mean "compelling evidence that plaintiff has in the past and is likely to again engage in
such conduct," thus giving rise to the presumption that a statement of homosexuality
would lead to such conduct. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989)
(emphasis added).
81. See 32 C.F.R. § 41 (setting forth the revisions to the 1981 policy); see also Krygowski, supra note 7, at 886-87 (reviewing the Reagan Administration's 1982 changes to
the homosexual separation policy). For purposes of clarity, this Note will refer to the
1981 regulations and the 1982 revisions collectively as the "1981 policy."
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use of the term "desire," because this term could mean either an
abstract "inclination" or a more concrete "likelihood" to commit an
act." This ambiguity forced the judiciary to define the policy's scope
and, inevitably, there were discrepancies among the courts in their
interpretations. 8 In Ben-Shalom v. Marsh,s3 the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit purported to adopt the "likelihood" standard. In
so doing, the court stated that it was rational to presume a desire or
"propensity" to engage in homosexual acts based on an announcement of homosexuality, which was "compelling evidence that glaintiff
has in the past and is likely to again engage in such conduct." However, the Ben-Shalom court seemed to adhere to the broader
interpretation of "desire" as a mere "inclination." This was evidenced by the fact that the court based its conclusion on "propensity"
exclusively on the plaintiff's declaration, without concrete proof that
she had previously engaged or would engage in homosexual activities
at any time. 7
Other courts attempted to impose more certainty as to the scope
of the 1981 policy by specifically addressing the potential implications
of the dual meaning of "desire" on the military's anti-homosexual
policy."' The Ninth Circuit, in particular, delineated the scope of the
82. The mere desire or fantasy of committing an act is not punishable in civilian society. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (concluding that punishing
someone for mere status as a drug user would be no different than imprisoning someone
for having the common cold); see also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 543 (1968)
("Punishment for a status is particularly obnoxious, and in many instances can reasonably
be called cruel and unusual, because it involves punishment for a mere propensity.").
83. See Wells-Petry, supra note 8, at 32-34 (demonstrating how the policy could be
interpreted as targeting homosexual "orientations" or a more tangible "likelihood" to
engage in homosexual conduct).
84. See, e.g., Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 941-46 (Luttig, J., concurring) (arguing the terms
of the policy have been misinterpreted). Compare Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464
(appearing to adopt an "inclination" version of "desire"), with Meinhold v. United States
Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1479 (9th Cir. 1994) (defining "desire" as a "concrete"
intention, thus resembling the "likelihood" definition).
85. 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989); see also infra notes 134-46 and accompanying text
(setting forth the facts of Ben-Shalom).
86. Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464 (emphasis added).
87. See id.The fact that "actual lesbian conduct [was not] admitted by plaintiff on
any particular occasion, and the Army ...offered no evidence of such conduct" was sufficient grounds for the district court in Ben-Shalom to find "no reason to believe that the
lesbian admission meant that plaintiff was likely to commit homosexual acts." Id.Therefore, the Seventh Circuit upheld Ben-Shalom's discharge, while still maintaining the lower
court's language, by inferring a desire to engage in lesbian activities based strictly on her
speech, and yet labeling this desire a "likelihood" to commit such acts.
88. See Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 919-20 (W.D. Wash. 1994), appeal
dismissed as moot and remanded,97 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1996). Some scholars have advocated a more narrow interpretation of the military's policy against homosexuals. See id.
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separation policy for gays in the military in Meinhold v. United States
Departmentof Defense. Influenced by the tradition of judicial deference to the military,9° the court interpreted the policy as
"prohibit[ing] conduct" and prohibiting "persons likely to engage in
prohibited conduct" from serving in the military, 91 and concluded that
the statute could "reasonably be construed to reach only statements
that show a concrete, fixed, or expressed desire to commit homosexual acts despite their being prohibited."' ' Hence, the Ninth Circuit
narrowly interpreted the term "desire," such that, only those statements which clearly prove that a soldier is likely to engage in
homosexual conduct constitute a permissible basis for discharge.
(quoting Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, who implied that
a declaration of homosexuality without further proof of a "propensity" toward homosexual conduct was insufficient to raise the presumption under the military policy); cf.
Stiehm, supra note 73, at 709-10 (urging the military to find a non-prejudicial means to
deal with homosexuals in the military).
89. See 34 F.3d 1469, 1477-80 (9th Cir. 1994). The Navy discharged Meinhold when
he announced," 'Yes, I am in fact gay'" on ABC World News Tonight. See id at 1472.
The Navy regulations under which he was discharged echoed the 1981 policy. See idat
1472 n.2 (citing the 1981 policy and the Navy regulations under which Meinhold was discharged). The Ninth Circuit specifically refused to comment on the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy, which became effective after the case was initiated and, thus, did not affect
the proceeding. See id.
90. The court implied that it would have found the regulation unconstitutional but for
judicial deference to the military, stating that "whether the regulation passes constitutional muster is a close question only because of the greater license we give the military to
control the military environment." Id. at 1479. Instead, the court attempted to interpret
the regulations as separating soldiers based not on their homosexual status, which would
violate the soldiers' equal protection rights, but on conduct or a "likelihood" of conduct.
See id. at 1477-79; see also Wells-Petry, supra note 8, at 30-40 (discussing the status versus
conduct distinction).
91. Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1479. By interpreting "desire" to mean a concrete
"likelihood" to engage in homosexual conduct, the Ninth Circuit presented the discharged
service member with a lower, and perhaps more reasonable, burden of proof than if the
court had interpreted "desire" to be nothing more than an abstract "inclination." But cf.
supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (summarizing Judge Luttig's argument that
"likelihood" is too lenient because it increases the probability that an admitted homosexual can rebut the presumption that he will engage in homosexual conduct).
92. Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1479. Upon reviewing Meinhold's situation, the court reversed his discharge, finding that he had been separated solely because of his statement of
orientation and that "[h]is statement--'I am in fact gay'-in the circumstances under
which he made it manifest[ed] no concrete, expressed desire to commit homosexual acts."
Id. at 1479-80. Overall, decisions of courts within the Ninth Circuit appear sympathetic to
homosexuals who are discharged for coming out; thus, Meinhold is in keeping with the
circuit's predisposition towards granting relief to gay soldiers. See Holmes v. California
Army Nat'l Guard, 920 F. Supp. 1510,1534 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (finding that the "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy violated a soldier's equal protection rights); Cammermeyer, 850 F.
Supp. at 926 (finding that plaintiff's discharge was based on her statement of sexual orientation in violation of her equal protection rights).
93. See Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1479-80. The Meinhold case was at the center of the
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The next major revampment of the homosexual separation policy occurred under the Clinton Administration, when the President
attempted to liberalize the policy and allow openly homosexual individuals to serve by suggesting that gay and lesbian soldiers would be
evaluated on the basis of conduct, rather than mere sexual orientation.' 4 After widespread resistance from many within the military
and their congressional supporters, 9 Congress and the President
agreed on the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, which was ultimately
codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654.96 Congress listed the fifteen findings
upon which it based the statute, and then set forth the three grounds
for discharge of a gay or lesbian service member. 9 While the current
policy is similar to the 1981 policy, 8 Congress attempted to eliminate
the debate caused by the prior use of "desire" by replacing it with the
term "propensity."
Congress's attempt to clarify the policy failed, as courts analyzpolitical debate surrounding the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. See generally Chandler
Burr, FriendlyFire: How PoliticsShaped Policy on Gays in the Military, CAL. LAW., June
1994, at 54passim (describing how Meinhold influenced the creation of the policy).
94. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 936 (Luttig, J., concurring) (citing Remarks Announcing the New Policy on Homosexuals in the Military, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1109, 1111
(July 19, 1993)). The President was not entirely successful, as the statute that was ultimately codified does not specifically exclude sexual orientation as grounds for discharge.
See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1994).
95. See Stewart M. Powell, Clinton Signs Gays-in-Military Bilk After a Tumultuous
Fight To Ease Restrictions, the "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell" Policy Is OKd, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Dec. 2, 1993, at A04 ("Congress and the Joint Chiefs of Staff rebelled against Clinton's campaign promise to allow gays to serve openly in the armed forces."). Compare
Memorandum from Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 (July
19, 1993), in Assessment of the Plan to Lift the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military:
HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Military Forces and Personnel of the House Comm. on
Armed Servs., 103d Cong. 22 (1993) (outlining the new policy and stating that only homosexual conduct, not orientation, will be grounds for separation), with S. REP. No. 103-112,
at 289 (1993) (setting forth Congress's belief that "the Department of Defense has retained the central features of its policy concerning homosexuality in the armed forces"),
96. See 10 U.S.C. § 654; see also Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 921-23 (providing a comprehensive review of the political evolution of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy).
97. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a), (b). See generally Krygowski, supra note 7, at 907-14
(reviewing the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy).
98. See Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1286 (2d Cir. 1996) ("A comparison of
the former policy with the Act and the new Directives (the 'new policy') reveals that the
grounds for separation under the two are virtually identical.").
99. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2). The statute specifically states that a service member
who "has stated that he or she is a homosexual" may rebut the presumption and avoid
separation by "demonstrat[ing] that he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to
engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts." Id. A
soldier who has been accused of being homosexual under the "conduct provision" of
§ 654(b)(1) can also rebut the presumption, in part, by proving that he or she "does not
have a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts." Id. § 654(b)(1)(E).
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ing whether alleged homosexuals have rebutted the statutory presumption continue to grapple with the meaning of "propensity. ' ' an
The Department of Defense is largely responsible for this ambiguity
in the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, because it did not strictly adhere to the terms of 10 U.S.C. § 654 in promulgating its regulations.1°
Rather than requiring service members to disprove a "propensity" in
order to rebut the presumption of homosexual conduct, the regulations maintain that a declared homosexual must prove that he or she
does not "desire" to engage in homosexual conduct.'02
The presence of two differing definitions of "propensity"
prompted courts to address the ambiguity of the term. Some courts
adopted the Ninth Circuit standard under the 1981 policy that the
military must provide evidence that a soldier's communication of
homosexuality permitted the inference of "concrete desires" to en°
gage in homosexual conduct.' 3 For example, in Watson v. Perry,O
the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington interpreted both the statute and the regulations as reaching only
those soldiers communicating "'a concrete, expressed desire'" to
100. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 944 (Luttig, J., concurring) (asserting that use of the
term "propensity" does not alter the effect of the statute, which "was unmistakenly addressed to homosexuality per se, rather than the likelihood of conduct"). Other courts,
such as the Ninth Circuit in Meinhold v. United States Department of Defense, 34 F.3d
1469 (9th Cir. 1994), ignore other potential definitions and tacitly interpret "propensity"
as a "desire" to engage in homosexual activity, further manifesting the confusion among
the courts as to the exact scope of the policy. See id. at 1476,1479. For a discussion of the
variable meanings of "propensity," see infra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
101. See 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A (1995). Congress indicated that the statute should be
read in conjunction with the regulations issued by the Department of Defense. See 10
U.S.C. § 654 (b) ("A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed
forces under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense if one or more of the
following findings is made and approved in accordance with procedures set forth in such
regulations."). But see supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (outlining Judge Luttig's
argument that the regulations should be voided, and that only the statutory language
should remain).
102. Compare 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (setting forth the "propensity" standard), with 32
C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A (1995) (setting forth the "desires" standard and stating that a service
member must prove he or she does not fall under this regulatory definition of a homosexual in order to rebut the presumption); see also Wells-Petry, supra note 8, at 32-34
(discussing the nuances of the regulatory definition of the policy).
103. See, e.g., Watson v. Perry, 918 F. Supp. 1403, 1414-15 (W.D. Wash. 1996). For a
discussion of the rationale used by the Ninth Circuit to interpret the term "desire," see
supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
104. 918 F. Supp. 1403 (W.D. Wash. 1996). Watson was discharged after admitting his
homosexual orientation and stating that he did not intend to rebut the presumption raised
under the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. See id at 1406-07. Had Watson merely announced his homosexual orientation without explicitly refusing to rebut the presumption,
the outcome of his case may have been different. See id. at 1414-15.
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engage in homosexual conduct, rather than those who merely communicate a sexual orientation or abstract preference.' °5 Other courts
adopted the "likelihood" interpretation of "propensity" out of necessity, based on determinations that lowering the standard to a mere
"inclination" would render the policy void under the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment. In Thorne v. United States Department of Defense,'o for example, the court adopted the
"likelihood" definition under the regulations, since requiring a homosexual soldier to rebut all possible inferences of an "inclination"
to engage inhomosexual conduct would amount to an unconstitutional discharge based on status alone.1 ° Some courts avoided the
l the
definition debate altogether. For example, in Selland v. Perry,08
court stated: "Indeed, it is unclear what factors Will rebut the presumption of 'propensity' to commit homosexual acts so that a
member's mere homosexual 'orientation' will not require his separation from service."' 9 Thus, while the majority of courts appear to
lean toward the more moderate interpretation of the "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy by interpreting "propensity" as a "likelihood," the
terminology debate has by no means been resolved.1
105. See id.;
see also Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260, 265 (D. Md. 1995) (implying
that if mere "orientation" invoked the presumption, it would impose a sanction on homosexual status), affd, 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). But see Thomasson, 80
F.3d at 934-35 (Luttig, J., concurring) (arguing that the Administration distorted the policy's scope through the regulatory definition of "propensity"). According to the Watson
court, statements such as "'I have a homosexual orientation,'" as opposed to "'I am
homosexual,'" would not be sufficient to give rise to the presumption of homosexuality
under the statutory language. See Watson, 918 F. Supp. at 1414.
106. 916 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Va. 1996), opinion supplemented by 945 F. Supp. 924, 926
(E.D. Va. 1996) (mem.); see also infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text (discussing the
Thorne court's interpretation that "propensity" means "likelihood" in order to mitigate
the potential facial unconstitutionality of the statute).
107. See Thorne, 916 F. Supp. at 1364-66; see also Holmes v. California Army Nat'l
Guard, 920 F. Supp. 1510, 1527 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (finding that there must be a distinction
between a homosexual orientation and a "propensity" (defined by the regulation as a
"likelihood") to engage in gay acts or the policy would violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment).
108. 905 F. Supp. 260 (D. Md. 1995), affd, 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam);
see also infra notes 177-84 and accompanying text (discussing Selland).
109. Selland, 905 F. Supp. at 265. The district court analyzed the equal protection and
free speech issues of the case without expressly favoring a "likelihood" or "inclination"
interpretation. See id. at 265-67.
110. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 941-46 (Luttig, J.,
concurring). But see Able v. United
States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1298-99 (1996) (disagreeing expressly with Judge Luttig's conclusions and adopting the "likelihood" standard). Judge Luttig advocated the broadest
scope of the policy by supporting the "inclination" definition as the sole interpretation.
See infra notes 310-36 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of Judge Luttig's arguments).
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The judiciary's reluctance to interfere in military matters is often
at the core of why military discharges of homosexuals are upheld."'
Courts consistently have hesitated to upset established military policies, largely due to their sense of isolation from the military."2 These
cases suggest that the judiciary is inhibited from acting in the military
sphere because of the lack of express constitutional powers allotted
to the courts over the military" In addition to the courts' constitutional separation from the military, the courts are also unfamiliar
with the unique society the military has developed to most effectively
serve the country."4 As the Supreme Court has stated: "'The inescapable demands of military discipline and obedience to orders
cannot be taught on battlefields; the habit of immediate compliance
with military procedures and orders must be virtually reflex with no
time for debate or reflection.' "" Taken together, these factors help
explain judicial hesitancy to strike down military policies on homosexuality that might be deemed unconstitutional in the civilian
world."
111. See Richenberg v. Perry, 73 F.3d 172, 173 (8th Cir. 1995) (referring to courts that
have relied on "the need for judicial deference to military decisions regarding what rules
are rationally required to maintain effective military forces" as a compelling reason to
limit judicial interference with the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh,
881 F.2d 454, 461 (7th Cir. 1989) (concluding that it would be "risky" for the judiciary to
order changes in the military, and that other branches are "better equipped to make such
determinations").
112. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981) (finding the judiciary to be
markedly incompetent in the military arena); Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 925 (stating that the
judiciary is not equipped with the expertise to make sound military decisions).
113. The Framers of the Constitution excluded the judicial branch from controlling
and directing the armed forces by expressly delegating all such powers to the legislative
and executive branches. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-17 (assigning and enumerating
the military duties of Congress); U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 1 (naming the President as
Commander in Chief of the various armed services of the United States); see also Selland,
905 F. Supp. at 264 (citing the plenary powers given to Congress and the President as a
reason for refraining from a detailed inquiry into the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy).
See generally Hirschhorn, supra note 1 (analyzing the doctrine of judicial deference toward the military).
114. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (stating that "the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society"). According to Professor
Hirschhorn, "[e]ven in peacetime, the basic value differences between the military and
civilian cultures will continue to produce litigation to bring the one into harmony with the
other." Hirschhorn, supranote 1, at 251.
115. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508 (1986) (quoting Chappell v. Wallace,
462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) (alteration in original)); cf. Parker,417 U.S. at 758-59 ("The
fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally
impermissible outside it.").
116. Soldiers are widely considered to have fewer constitutional rights than they possessed as civilians, though the military's power to suppress the speech of soldiers is still
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The courts are also reluctant to overturn the military's anti-gay
policy because to do so would be largely contrary to the judiciary's
historical rejection of claims by homosexuals." 7 One such rejection
occurred in Bowers v. Hardwick,"' a 1986 Supreme Court decision
addressing a state statute that criminalized sodomy." 9 Hardwick, a
gay man that was convicted under the statute, asserted that his conviction violated his fundamental right to privacy under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that
"homosexual activity is a private and intimate association that is beyond the reach of state regulation."' 2 Given the lack of textual
direction on fundamental rights in the Constitution, 121 the Court relied upon the traditional test of determining whether certain conduct
warrants "heightened judicial protection" because it is a fundamental
right: either the "right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "'2 The Bowers majority held that the states have
somewhat limited. See Parker,417 U.S. at 758; Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 954 (Hall, J., dissenting).
117. The two principal claims typically brought by military personnel, including Lt.
Thomasson, are that the policy violates the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment and that it impinges on their right to free speech. For a historical review of
First Amendment claims against the military, see infra notes 193-248 and accompanying
text.
118. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
119. See id. at 188 n.1 (relaying the pertinent parts of GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2
(1984)). Georgia is not the only state that currently criminalizes sodomy; such states
within the Fourth Circuit include Maryland, see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 553-54
(1996); North Carolina, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1993); South Carolina, see S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law Co-op. 1976); and Virginia, see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361
(Michie 1996).
120. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189. Because Hardwick was challenging a state statute, his
constitutional challenge fell under the Fourteenth Amendment as opposed to the Fifth
Amendment, which applies to federal actions. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V
(stating the Due Process Clause applicable to the federal government); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (stating the Due Process Clause applicable to the states).
121. The lack of express provisions on fundamental rights concerned the Bowers
Court, which observed that the judiciary is "most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the Constitution." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.
122. Id (citation omitted). The Court compiled the test from two prior Supreme
Court cases that addressed the issue of fundamental rights-Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937), which determined that the ban on double jeopardy was a fundamental right, and Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977), which held that the
fundamental right to family included those blood relatives beyond the nuclear family. See
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92. In Palko, the Court further shaped the concept of fundamental liberty by characterizing such rights as those where "neither liberty nor justice would
exist if [they] were sacrificed." Palko, 302 U.S. at 326 (citing Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78, 99 (1908)).
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historically criminalized sodomy and, thus, a right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy could not be considered a fundamental
liberty.' The Court, moreover, refused to extend the right to privacy
to include homosexual sodomy, 24 finding that it had no connection to
any of the previously recognized fundamental rights, such as marriage,'2 procreation,12 contraception,127 and abortion.)

Finally, the

Court rejected Hardwick's argument that the statute was irrational
because it was based on no more than moral perceptions, stating that
"[t]he law ...is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all

laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed."' 29
In the years since Bowers, the debate over discharging gay and
lesbian soldiers has come to the forefront of judicial attention, and
plaintiffs have attempted to distance themselves from the negative
precedential effect of Bowers by attacking the military's policies as a
violation of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's substantive due process
123. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94. Although the Georgia statute at issue broadly
prohibited both heterosexual and homosexual sodomy, the Bowers majority only discussed the criminalization of "homosexual sodomy." See id.
124. See id at 190-91.
125. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (protecting a couple's choice to engage in an interracial marriage from state interference by finding marriage to be a part of
the fundamental right to privacy).
126. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reL Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (classifying
procreation as a fundamental right warranting constitutional protection).
127. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (allowing couples to
make decisions regarding contraceptive use without state regulation by including contraception in the fundamental right to privacy).
128. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973) (shielding abortion from state interference by classifying it as part of a woman's fundamental right to privacy).
129. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
130. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,
570-74 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 463-66 (7th Cir. 1989). An
equal protection challenge may be evaluated under one of three judicial standards of review: (1) strict scrutiny, under which the regulation must be narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling governmental interest (reserved for race and national origin); (2) intermediate scrutiny, under which the regulation must be substantially related to an important
governmental end (reserved primarily for gender); and (3) rational basis review, under
which the regulation must rationally advance a legitimate governmental purpose in order
to be upheld. See Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 914 (W.D. Wash. 1994), appeal dismissed as moot and remanded, 97 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1996); accord City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-42 (1985) (describing the three
classes of review applied to equal protection claims). For a theoretical look at the traditional standards of judicial review, see R. Randall Kelso, Three Years Hence: An Update
on Filling Gaps in the Supreme Court's Approach to ConstitutionalReview of Legislation,
36 S. TEX.L. Rav. 1, 2-7 (1995).
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decision in Bowers has influenced subsequent courts to refrain from
affording discharged homosexual service members heightened constitutional scrutiny as a suspect class.'
The rationale employed by
these courts has been that "[i]f homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a
suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis
scrutiny for equal protection purposes."'32 Thus, in the wake of Bowers, the judiciary has consistently denied gay service members the
strategic advantage of strict scrutiny, and has instead presented them
with the often insurmountable task of proving that the military policies on homosexuality are not a legitimate means to a rational end. 33
One of the first cases to reject heightened constitutional scrutiny
for gay service members was the Seventh Circuit decision in BenShalom v. Marsh.TM Miriam Ben-Shalom was a sergeant in the Army
Reserve when she was discharged under Army regulations mandating
the dismissal of any soldier that demonstrates "'homosexual tendencies,'" even if he or she does not act on those "'tendencies.' ,135
Ben-Shalom gained reinstatement for the remainder of her term after
a district court found no connection between her homosexual orientation and her ability to serve as an effective soldier. 36 The debate
131. See, e.g., Watson v. Perry, 918 F. Supp. 1403, 1416 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (holding
Watson's discharge did not violate his substantive due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment, since the right to engage in homosexual sodomy was not fundamental and,
therefore, Watson's claim must be considered under rational basis review). See generally
Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHi. L. REV. 1161 (1988) (discussing
the influence of Bowers on the debate over gays in the military).
132. Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464. Though the Bowers opinion did not address homosexuals in the military, several courts have cited it for the proposition that "[h]omosexual
acts can be prohibited by the military." See Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260, 263 (D.
Md. 1995), aff'd, 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); see also High Tech Gays v.
Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,571 (9th Cir. 1990) (reasoning that, in
light of Bowers, it would be "incongruous" to deem homosexuality a fundamental right
under the Equal Protection Clause).
133. See supra note 130 (discussing the elements for rational basis review under the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment).
134. See 881 F.2d 454,463-66 (7th Cir. 1989).
135. See id. at 456 (quoting the applicable regulations in 1976, Army Reg. 135-178,
para. 7-5(b)(6)).
136. See Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 977 (E.D. Wis. 1980);
accordCammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 922 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (holding that a
lesbian orientation does not have a negative impact on a soldier's ability to perform her
duties effectively), appeal dismissed as moot and remanded,97 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1996).
The most notable example of an attempt to rid the military of lesbians was the Parris Island investigation conducted by the United States Marine Corps, after which 65 of 246
women left the service upon being interrogated about their sexual orientation. See Michelle M. Benecke & Kirstin S. Dodge, Military Women in NontraditionalJob Fields:
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reignited, however, when the military refused Ben-Shalom reenlistment for an additional term on the grounds that she failed to rebut
the presumption of homosexuality pursuant to Army regulations. 7
Ben-Shalom brought a second suit against the military 8and, perhaps
influenced by the unfavorable treatment of the substantive due process argument raised in Bowers, she advanced a different method of
constitutional attack: the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment. 139 Ben-Shalom claimed that the Army discriminated
against her as a member of the homosexual class and that the military
policy discriminated "against a discrete and insular group" of soldiers
who admitted their homosexuality.' 4 The court rejected BenShalom's claim that she was a member of a suspect class, stating that
her acknowledgment of a lesbian orientation could "rationally and
reasonably be viewed as reliable evidence of a desire and propensity
to engage in homosexual conduct."' 41 Therefore, the court found that
"the regulation does not classify plaintiff based merely upon her
status as a lesbian, but upon reasonable inferences about her probable conduct in the past and in the future."' 42 The Seventh Circuit
reasoned that if criminal homosexual conduct did not warrant heightened judicial protection in Bowers, 43 then presumed homosexual
Casualtiesof the Armed Forces' War on Homosexuals, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 215,22021 (1990). Three women were even jailed after being criminally convicted for homosexual conduct. See id.
137. See Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 457 & n.3 (citing Army Reg. 140-111, ThI. 4-2, Rule
E, which mandated discharge of any service member who appears to be homosexual due

to a declaration of homosexuality or engaging in homosexual acts).
138. See i&. at 457.
139. See id.; see also Sunstein, supra note 131, at 1163 ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause
is a natural route for constitutional protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation."). Ben-Shalom also claimed that the policy restricted her freedom of
speech, thereby violating the First Amendment. See infra notes 210-17 and accompanying
text. Though the district court had agreed with Ben-Shalom on First Amendment
grounds, the Seventh Circuit reversed and held the statute constitutional. See BenShalom, 881 F.2d at 458-62.
140. See Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 457.

141. Id. at 464.
142. Id. But cf. Richenberg v. Perry, 73 F.3d 172, 173-74 (8th Cir. 1995) (Arnold, C.J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the court's presumption that an admission of homosexuality translates into homosexual conduct, since many people have propensities or inclinations, but
never engage in actions pursuant to them). The Seventh Circuit in Ben-Shalom partially
relied on Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987), in which the court upheld an
FBI policy refusing to hire homosexuals under rational basis review. See Ben-Shalom, 881
F.2d at 465.
143. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-96 (1986). While the Seventh Circuit
recognized that Bowers was decided under substantive due process, the court nevertheless
found the decision to "impact[] on the scrutiny aspects under an equal protection analysis." See Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464.
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conduct in the: military also fails to invoke strict scrutiny.' 44 Furthermore, the court deferred to the military's judgment that homosexual
conduct poses a legitimate threat to unit cohesion and effectiveness,
finding the regulations to be neither "gross[ly] unfair[]" nor
"invidious.'

145

Consequently, the court concluded that the govern-

ment's interest in preserving unit integrity outweighs the undeniable
prejudice against homosexuals in the military and, therefore, upheld
Ben-Shalom's discharge.'4
The Ninth Circuit further developed the debate over the issue of
the equal protection rights of gay and lesbian soldiers in Pruitt v.
Cheney, 47 which involved the dismissal of a lesbian military chaplain
after she proclaimed her homosexuality.' 4 Like the Ben-Shalom
149
court, the Pruittcourt applied the rational basis standard of review.
While the court acknowledged that it must defer to the military's expertise on its internal affairs, it was unwilling to completely excuse
the military from proving the rationality and validity of its regulations, since to do so would "come close to denying reviewability at
all."' ° The trial court had not decided the equal protection issue be144. See Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464-65.
145. See id. at 465-66.
146. See id. The court further rationalized its decision by stating that the holding did
not preclude homosexuals from exercising political power to protect their interests, see id.
at 466 & n.9, a theory supported by the increased political recognition of gays evidenced
by President Clinton's endorsement of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, see supra notes
7-12 and accompanying text (discussing the heightened attention to homosexual issues in
the political arena).
147. 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991) (opinion amended May 8, 1992).
148. See icL at 1161. Pruitt had also "twice gone through ceremonies of marriage to
other women" in violation of Army Reg. 135-175, 2-39 (c), quoted in Pruitt,963 F.2d at
1162 n.3, but the court did not address that issue. See Pruitt,963 F.2d at 1161-62, 1162 n.3.
149. See Pruitt, 963 F.2d at 1165-66. The court largely relied on High Tech Gays v.
Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571-78 (9th Cir. 1990), and
City of Cleburne v. CleburneLiving Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985), in determining
whether to be lenient or relatively stringent in its application of rational basis review to
the claim that the military violated Pruitt's equal protection rights. See Pruitt,963 F.2d at
1165-66.
150. See Pruitt,963 F.2d at 1167. But cf. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) ("A
State ... has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory
classification."). Unlike the Seventh Circuit's limited investigation into whether the
Army regulations had a rational basis in Ben-Shalom, the Ninth Circuit refused to "spare
the Army the task.., of offering a rational basis for its regulation, nor will we deprive
Pruitt of the opportunity to contest that basis." Pruitt,963 F.2d at 1166. The active rational review standard in Cleburne, where the court applied such a stringent version of
rational review that it appeared to be some form of heightened scrutiny, served as the
model for the Ninth Circuit. See id. at 1165-66 ("[lIt is clear that [in High Tech Gays,] we
applied the type of 'active' rational basis review employed by the Supreme Court in City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,Inc .... "). The Pruitt court also referred to a test
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cause plaintiff failed to make the assertion in the complaint, 51 so the
stating
Ninth Circuit remanded the issue for further consideration,
52
issue.
definite
a
were
rights
Amendment
Fifth
that Pruitt's
As gay and lesbian rights drew increasing public attention, the
military's policy of discharging homosexuals came under more intense civilian scrutiny and courts began to waiver on whether the
policy was entirely constitutional.' 53 The case that is perhaps most
responsible for alerting the public to the military's policies on homosexuality is Cammerneyer v. Aspin.54 Margarethe Cammermeyer
was a Lieutenant Colonel in the National Guard and served as one of
the Army's most decorated and widely respected nurses for over seventeen years.' 55 In 1989, she applied for entrance into the Army War
College and, when asked about her sexual orientation during a routine security clearance, she truthfully answered that she was a lesbian,
but was not sexually active.1 The military ultimately withdrew her
federal recognition '7 pursuant to Department of Defense regulations,' 58 thereby precluding her from serving in the Army National
devised in Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971), to determine the reviewability
of military decisions, though the parties did not dispute the court's authority to review the
case. See Pruitt,963 F.2d at 1167 n.6 (citing Mindes, 453 F.2d at 201-02).
151. See Pruitt,963 F.2d at 1164.
152. See id. at 1167.
153. See Kelly E. Henriksen, Comment, Gays, the Military, and Judicial Deference:
When the Courts Must Reclaim Equal Protection as Their Area of Expertise, 9 ADMIN. L.
J. AM. U. 1273, 1292-1303 (1996).

154. 850 F. Supp. 910 (W.D. Wash. 1994), appeal dismissed as moot and remanded, 97
F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1996). Lieutenant Colonel Cammermeyer's discharge has been described as "attract[ing] headlines around the country and eventually help[ing to] persuade
the Clinton Administration to change its policy on gays in the military." David Van Biema, Military Ins and Outs (Gays in the Military), TIME, June 13, 1994, at 66, 66.
155. See Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 912. Lieutenant Colonel Cammermeyer received many honors, including the Bronze Star in recognition of her exemplary service in
the Vietnam War. See id. She earned Masters and Doctorate degrees in nursing, served
as a member of the faculty for the University of San Francisco School of Nursing, and
acted as Chief Nurse for several top units in Washington. See id
156. See id. at 912-13, 913 n.4. The "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy was designed to
terminate this kind of questioning. See Remarks Announcing the New Policy on Homosexuals in the Military, 1 PuB. PAPERS 1111 (July 19, 1993). However, the efforts were
not entirely successful. See Shapiro et al., supranote 6, at 42-44.
157. To serve as an officer in the United States National Guard, a service member
must be promoted to the same officer level in the state National Guard and receive federal recognition of her service in the National Guard. If federal recognition is withdrawn,
the individual can no longer serve as a member of the National Guard. See 10 U.S.C.
§ 12201(a) (1994); see also Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 920 F. Supp. 1510,
1521-22 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (explaining the organization of the National Guard).
158. See Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 919; DOD Directive 1332.14, reprinted in 32
C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A (1982).
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Cammermeyer claimed the discharge violated her equal protection rights, since she was discriminated against solely because of her
admitted lesbian orientation.'O Controlled by Ninth Circuit precedent, the district court applied the rational basis standard of review."'
The court, however, only accorded the military limited judicial deference when considering its rationales for the policy, stating that "there
is not and must never be a 'military exception' to the Constitution."1' 62
The court stressed that for the policy to be constitutional, the government must prove the policy was based on more than homophobia,
since it is well-established that "[a] discriminatory classification that
is based on prejudice or bias is not rational as a matter of lav."'1 In
an effort to do so, the government once again asserted that the policy
was constitutional under Bowers and that the military rationally construed statements of homosexuality as a sign of future homosexual
conduct.' 4 The Cammermeyer court, however, rejected the government's argument that status, defined in terms of homosexual
orientation, equaled homosexual conduct,'a stating that Cammer159. See Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 913.
160. See id. at 912.
161. See id. at 914-15; see also High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Offlce, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) (employing rational basis review for homosexual
equal protection claims).
162. Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 915. See generally id at 915-16 (reviewing the
amount of judicial deference the court exercises when the military is a party to the suit).
The court's refusal to presume the rationality of the military policy without evidence was
consistent with the Ninth Circuit's holding in Pruitt. See Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160,
1166-67 (9th Cir. 1991) (opinion amended May 8, 1992); cf. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 949
(Hall, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts should not merely assume that a military policy
is constitutional).
163. Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 915 (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433
(1984)); accord Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 951 (Hall, J., dissenting) (arguing that prejudice is
an irrational basis for any government policy).
164. See Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 918-19.
165. See id at 919-20. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it violates the
Fourteenth Amendment to criminalize a status, such as alcoholism or drug addiction;
instead, the state must wait for the individual to commit the actual offense of illegally
drinking or using drugs before it can impose punishment. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514, 530-33 (1968); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962). Therefore, in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), Georgia acted within the parameters of prior
precedent when it penalized Hardwick for engaging in the act of homosexual sodomy.
See id at 187-88. The military's homosexual discharge policy, however, is not as constitutionally stable, since the military must infer from a soldier's declaration of homosexuality
that homosexual conduct is so imminent that it is as if the soldier actually committed a
homosexual act. Cf. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454,464 (1989) (demonstrating how
the Seventh Circuit inferred that the holding of Bowers applied to the equal protection
analysis, as well as due process, because gays cannot be a suspect class if gay conduct can
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meyer's "acknowledgment of her lesbian orientation itself is not reliable evidence of her desire or propensity to engage in homosexual
conduct."' 6 Therefore, the Cammenneyer court found it unreasonable and discriminatory to assume that mere homosexual orientation
was sufficient to warrant punishment under the policy." 7 In order to
uphold the discharge, the government would have to present additional justifications for the policy beyond
a mere inference of conduct
16
drawn from homosexual orientation. 8
The government further attempted to justify the dismissal of
homosexuals by citing the professional opinions of high-ranking military personnel, such as General Colin Powell, who feared that
allowing open homosexuals "'to exist in the force would affect the
cohesion and well-being of the force.' "'69 As additional support for
separating homosexual soldiers, the government cited Congress's
enumerated reasons for creating the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy
in § 654(a)(1)-(15).'70 Cammermeyer rebutted each of the governbe criminalized). However, courts distinguish Supreme Court cases on status, such as
Powell and Robinson, from the debate over homosexuals in the military because a military discharge is not a criminal proceeding. See Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260,265 (D.
Md. 1995), aff'd, 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). But see Cammermeyer, 850 F.
Supp. at 919-20 (finding the distinction between status and conduct in the criminal context
to apply to the case at bar). Some scholars also find "[t]he distinction between status and
conduct [to be] a very dangerous strategy to pursue," because it could have the negative
repercussion of increasing the military's scrutiny of service members' personal lives. See
Diane H. Mazur, The Unknown Soldier: A Critiqueof "Gays in the Military" Scholarship
and Litigation, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 223,245 (1996).
166. Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 919; see also Richenberg v. Perry, 73 F.3d 172,
173-74 (8th Cir. 1995) (Arnold, C.J., dissenting) (faulting the military policy for irrationally assuming that one's orientation will necessarily lead to the acting out of those
inclinations). But see Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464 (agreeing that an admission of homosexual orientation invokes the rational presumption of a "propensity" or desire to engage
in homosexual conduct). The Cammermeyer court found further support for distinguishing between conduct and status in evidence that homosexuals are more likely than
heterosexuals to restrain their sexual urges, if for no other reason than the scarce opportunities to act upon them. See Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 920 (citation omitted).
167. The Cammermeyer court further criticized the military's equation of status with
conduct by citing the fact that the military does not expel known alcoholics and drug addicts without first requiring evidence that these "orientations" impair their conduct. See
Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 920 n.13.
168. See id.at 919; see also id. at 920 (citation omitted) (finding that discharging someone based solely on her status failed to further any military interest).
169. Id at 921 (quoting Hearing to Receive Testimony on DOD Policy on Service of
Gay Men & Lesbians in the Armed Forces: Hearing Before the Senate Armed Servs.
Comm., 103d Cong. 25 (July 20, 1993) (statement of General Colin Powell) [hereinafter
Powell, DOD Hearing]). Powell distinguished African-Americans, who had also been
excluded from the military under similar rationales, by classifying race or color as
"benign" characteristics, whereas homosexuality tends to be a far more complex and
amorphous characteristic. See id.
(citing Powell, DOD Hearing,supra, at 25).
170. See id. at 920-21; see also 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1)-(15) (1994) (setting forth the con-
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ment's justifications for the policy, providing evidence that homosexuals did not threaten (1) military service and mission; (2)
discipline, order and morale of the unit; (3) unit cohesion; (4) the
rank and command structure of the military; (5) privacy of other soldiers; (6) future recruiting of new soldiers who might be deterred by
the presence of gays in the military; or (7) the security of the nation.
The court held that not only had Cammermeyer met her
burden of proof and discredited any possible rationale the government might use to support its position,' 72 but also found that the
government had been motivated by irrational prejudice in creating
the poicy.Y3 Consequently, the court held that the policy violated
Cammermeyer's Fifth Amendment equal protection rights.
Prior to the enactment of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy,
litigants had challenged the respective policies on homosexuality of
each military branch, all of which had used the 1981 policy as a
guideline 75 However, the implementation of the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy superseded pre-existing individual policies and mandated
that all proceedings against homosexuals pending on the policy's effective date recommence under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." 76 One of
the first cases decided under the new policy was Selland v. Perry.'"
gressional findings warranting an exclusionary policy on gays and lesbians in the armed
forces). While Cammermeyer was decided under Army regulations and not under the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, the Cammermeyer court considered congressional findings of fact in 10 U.S.C. § 654(a) when determining whether a rational basis existed for
the military's policy. See Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 921 & n.17.
171. See Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 922-24.
172. See id at 924.
173. See id. at 924-26 (citing the admissions of numerous service personnel that the
policy and regulations were driven by prejudice against homosexuals). The court also
briefly considered public opinion on homosexuality and concluded that it failed to justify
Cammermeyer's discharge. See id at 923-24.
174. See id at 926.
175. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (outlining the terms of the 1981
policy).
176. See 141 CoNG. REC. S5171, S5172 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Nunn). President Clinton signed the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy on November 30,
1993. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 923. Some cases were initiated on the cusp of the two
policies, and those admitted homosexual soldiers were temporarily reinstated and placed
on standby inactive reserve status while they waited for the new policy to become effective. See Thorne v. United States Dep't of Defense, 916 F. Supp. 1358, 1362 (E.D. Va.
1996), opinion supplemented by 945 F. Supp. 924, 926 (E.D. Va. 1996) (mem.); Selland v.
Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260, 263 (D. Md. 1995), affd, 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); see also infra notes 289-90 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of
allowing known homosexuals to serve while waiting for the new statute to come into ef-

fect).
177. 905 F. Supp. 260 (D. Md. 1995), affd, 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
The court preliminarily enjoined the Navy from proceeding with Selland's separation
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Lieutenant Selland revealed his homosexuality to his commanding
officer after consulting a chaplain about peer harassment.178 Selland
was subsequently discharged under 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) based on
his declaration, and he filed suit claiming the policy violated his Fifth
Amendment right to equal protection. 79
Like other jurisdictions before it, the Selland court applied rational basis review to the equal protection challenge.
In doing so,
the court implied that Selland faced a seemingly insurmountable
burden of disproving all possible rationalizations for the policy because policies reviewed under rational basis scrutiny are " 'accorded
a strong presumption of validity.' ,,1'Rather than follow Canmermeyer's successful lead of attacking the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy on numerous grounds,' s' Selland attempted to invalidate the
policy by claiming it was solely motivated by hatred and prejudice.'8
The court, however, found many possible justifications for the policy
beyond hatred and prejudice and, consequently, upheld the policy
because Selland failed to disprove every possible rational government purpose.14
The Selland decision was followed by Watson v. Perry,' an
opinion in which the court tempered the effect of judicial deference
to the military in an effort to conduct a more probing investigation

pending the new policy's effective date. See id.
at 263.
178. See id.Lieutenant Selland had served on a submarine, but was transferred to
shore duty after indicating he was homosexual. See id.
179. See id.at 265-67. Selland also challenged the policy under the First Amendment,
but the court rejected this challenge. See id. at 263-65.
180. See id.at 266. The court relied on Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), to support its application of rational basis review as opposed to a higher standard of scrutiny. See Selland,
905 F. Supp. at 265.
181. See Selland, 905 F. Supp. at 266 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,319 (1993)).
182. See Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 922-24 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (setting
forth the multiple arguments by Cammermeyer against the rationality of the Army's
regulations separating homosexuals), appeal dismissed as moot and remanded, 97 F.3d
1235 (9th Cir. 1996).
183. See Selland, 905 F. Supp. at 266.
184. See id. at 266-67. The court also indicated that the tension of living in close confines significantly influenced its decision to dismiss the equal protection claim; the court
stated that it would have been more difficult to rationalize the separation policy had Selland been stationed on a mainland base, rather than in the close quarters of a submarine.
See id. Thomasson was the next Fourth Circuit case to review the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. For a review of the Fourth Circuit's analysis of whether the policy violated Thomasson's equal
protection rights, see supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
185. 918 F. Supp. 1403 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
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into the validity of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy.'s The case
arose when Lieutenant Watson announced his homosexual orientation and further stated that he did not intend to rebut the
presumption raised under the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, but
rather to challenge the constitutionality of the policy itself.'8r Adhering to the Ninth Circuit's narrow interpretation of the separation
policy, the Watson court held that only statements expressing a concrete intent to engage in homosexual conduct provide constitutional
grounds for the discharge of an admitted gay soldier.'1 To reach this
conclusion, the Watson court interpreted both the statute and the
regulations as applying only to those soldiers with definite intentions
to engage in homosexual conduct, rather than those who merely
communicate an abstract preference.'8 Therefore, according to the
court, had Lieutenant Watson merely announced his sexual orientation, he could not have been constitutionally discharged because such
a statement would not have sufficed to invoke the presumption of
homosexual conduct.' g However, because Watson made the addi-

186. See iL at 1410-18.
187. See id. at 1406-07. Watson announced his homosexuality "(1) because of his
commitment to honesty, truthfulness, and integrity, and (2) to eliminate any potential for
a blackmail threat in the event he received a vessel command assignment." Id. at 1408.
188. See id. at 1414. The court held that the policy is facially valid under the Constitution, since statements such as "I have a homosexual orientation" would not suffice to give
rise to the presumption under the statute's wording. See iL Therefore, the court implied
that it does not consider mere sexual orientation to qualify as a "propensity" to engage in
homosexual acts, even under the statute.
189. See id. But see Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 934-35 (Luttig, J., concurring) (criticizing
courts for humoring the Administration's alleged distortion of the policy's scope through
the regulatory definition of "propensity").
190. See Watson, 918 F. Supp. at 1414.! This interpretation of the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy was in accord with President Clinton's intent that the new policy would only
focus on the conduct of gay service members, and not punish them for their homosexual
orientation like the 1981 policy had done. See Mazur, supra note 165, at 232; see also
Burr,supra note 93, at 54-57 (commenting on President Clinton's position that homosexual soldiers should only be discharged for their misconduct as opposed to their sexual
orientation).
The court also stated in dicta that a "reasonable constitutional construction of the
statue would not permit the presumption to be created by the statement, 'I am homosexual' alone unless it was clear that the speaker was defining himself or herself in
accordance with the statutory definition or otherwise manifesting an intent to engage in
homosexual acts." Id. at 1414 n.5; see also Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260,265 (D. Md.
1995) (alluding that mere statements of one's homosexuality were not sufficient to invoke
the presumption of a "propensity" to engage in homosexual conduct), aff'd, 100 F.3d 950
(4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 912 (W.D. Wash.
1994) (holding that an admission of lesbian orientation is not itself reliable evidence of
homosexual conduct), appeal dismissed as moot and remanded, 97 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir.
1996).
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tional statement that he would not rebut the presumption, he was
placed "on a different footing than if he had limited his statement to
orientation alone" and, consequently, the court held that the government had properly discharged him under § 654(b)(2). 191 Despite
this outcome, Watson reflects the growing resistance among some
courts to an equal protection challenge to the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy without substantial proof that the policy is punishing
conduct, and not mere status.'Y2
Equal protection is not the only constitutional basis of attack for
soldiers discharged under the statements provision; the policy is almost always challenged as an infringement on First Amendment
rights as well.' 9' For several decades, however, the judiciary has
minimized the potential for success of free speech claims by gay
service members by consistently accepting that members of the military have fewer First Amendment rights than civilians due to the
importance of the military's mission.: The military's restriction of
expression was questioned in Parker v. Levy, 95 when the Supreme
191. See Watson, 918 F. Supp. at 1415. The Watson court's decision had only a limited
impact on Thomasson, since Thomasson did not include the word "orientation" in his
admission. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 920.
192. Cf Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1477-80 (9th Cir.
1994) (conceding that the policy must target conduct, and not mere status, to avoid being
invalidated).
193. The First Amendment states, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
194. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) ("The military need not
encourage debate or tolerate protest to the extent that such tolerance is required of the
civilian state by the First Amendment .... "); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974)

("While the members of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by the
First Amendment, the different character of the military community and of the military
mission requires a different application of those protections.").
195. 417 U.S. 733 (1974). The military's restriction of speech was also questioned in
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), where the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a civilian charged with burning his Selective Service registration card in a
political demonstration. See id. at 386. Though O'Brien himself was a civilian, the Court
relied on the administrative and practical importance of draft cards in quickly and effectively preparing to defend the nation. See id. at 381. The Court first confirmed that when
actions involve both speech and non-speech factors, "a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non-speech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms." Id. at 376. The Court then evaluated the constitutionality of the
regulation using a four-prong test: (1) whether the regulation is within the constitutional
power of Congress; (2) whether the regulation advances a meaningful or significant government interest; (3) whether the purpose of the regulation is "unrelated to suppressing
free expression"; and (4) if the regulation does restrict free speech, whether it does so in
the least suppressive way possible. See id. at 377; see also Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d
454, 462 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing the O'Brien test). Under this test, the O'Brien Court upheld the government regulation prohibiting the destruction of draft cards, finding that it
did not constitute a violation of O'Brien's right to free of speech. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at
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Court considered whether the Army could conduct court-martial
proceedings against a military physician for expressing his sentiments
against the Vietnam War through the distribution of flyers." 6 ThenAssociate Justice Rehnquist opened his opinion by noting that "[t]he
Court has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society."'9' By identifying the
military as a distinct entity, the Supreme Court essentially directed
lower courts to accord substantial deference to the military's judgment. 198 The Court reasoned that, while soldiers retain some degree
of constitutional rights upon entering the military, "[t]he fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for
imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military
that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it."'
Consequently, the court upheld military restrictions of speech
deemed by the military to have an adverse impact on unit cohesiveness and effectiveness.Y
Finding Levy's speech to be of this
character, the court affirmed the Army's decision to convict Levy by
a court-martial
for his statements in opposition to the Vietnam
20 1
War.
The issue of free speech in the military resurfaced in Brown v.
Glines,2 which involved a captain removed from duty in the Air
Force Reserve after he solicited signatures for several petitions to
Congress complaining of the grooming standards of the Reserve. 2 ,
The Court again deferred to the judgment of the military, referring to
377.
196. The Army discharged Levy for violating Articles 90, 133 and 134 of the Uniform

Code of Military Justice. See Parker,417 U.S. at 737-38; see also 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1983)

(prohibiting assaulting or willfully disobeying a superior commanding officer); i § 933
(prohibiting "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman"); id. § 934 (covering all
other conduct that harms the armed forces in some way). For a historical review of the
court-martial, see Parker,417 U.S. at 744-49.
197. Parker,417 U.S. at 743. The Uniform Code of Military Justice embodies both the
legal and societal differences between the two communities. See id. at 749.
198. The ParkerCourt's deference to the military has been cited numerous times as a
justification for diluting judicial scrutiny of the military's conduct. See, e.g., Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,506-08 (1986); Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 925.
199. Parker,417 U.S. at 758.
200. See id. at 761.
201. See id. at 758-59, 761; see also United States v. Priest, 21 C.M.A. 564, 570, 45
C.M.R. 338, 344 (1972) (discussing the need to have different standards on speech in the
military).
202. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).

203. See id. at 351; see also 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (1976) ("No person may restrict any
member of an armed force in communicating with a member of Congress, unless the
communication is unlawful or violates a regulation necessary to the security of the United
States.").

1997]

"DON'TASK, DON'T TELL"

1001

established precedent that "the military must possess substantial discretion over its internal discipline, 2 4 and that "courts must be careful
not to 'circumscribe the authority of military commanders to an extent never intended by Congress.' "2W As in Parker, the Supreme
Court held in Brown that the Air Force Reserve acted well within its
discretion to protect the integrity of the unit and, therefore, the reaction to Glines's solicitation of signatures did not constitute a violation
of the First Amendment.2 While Glines's individual communication
to Congress would have been permitted, the solicitation of signatures
from his peers presented the unacceptable risk of disrupting the order and discipline of the unit, thus falling within the scope of the
military's discretion to regulate such actions.20
Thus, before the rights of gays and lesbians in the armed forces
came to the forefront of litigation, soldiers had challenged military
policies under the First Amendment primarily for more public issues,
ranging from restriction on anti-war sentiments to uniform codes of
dress.20' The 1981 policy directly banning gays and lesbians in all
branches of the military brought the challenges into a more private
sphere and precipitated numerous claims by discharged homosexuals
that the policy infringed on their First Amendment rights. 2 Among
these was the claim in Ben-Shalom,210 which reviewed under the First
204. Brown, 444 U.S. at 357; cf. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976) (emphasizing
the importance of deference to the military in a case centered on a soldier's distribution
of political propaganda).
205. Brown, 444 U.S. at 360 (quoting Huff v. Secretary of Navy, 575 F.2d 907, 916
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (Tamm, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev'd on other
grounds,444 U.S. 453 (1980)).
206. See id. at 353-58.
207. See id at 360-61. The Court noted that the regulations must "restrict speech no
more than is reasonably necessary to protect the substantial governmental interest." Id.
at 355. The judicial perception that it should shield the military from "unacceptable"
risks continued into those cases decided under the policies separating admitted homosexuals. See, e.g., Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260, 265 (D. Md. 1995) (finding it would
be inappropriate to force the Navy to retain Selland with his peers "until he committed a
homosexual act after [he] stated that he was homosexual in the close confines of an attack
submarine"), affd, 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
208. See supra notes 193-207 and accompanying text; see also Watson v. Perry, 918 F.
Supp. 1403, 1417 (W.D. Wash. 1996) ("The lesson of [Parker and Brown] is that the servicemember's interests in autonomy, self-identity, and political expression are subordinate
to the interest of the military in good order and discipline, morale, unit cohesion, and
combat readiness.").
209. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (discussing the terms of the 1981
policy); infra notes 210-48 and accompanying text (reviewing challenges to homosexual
separation policies in the military). Only those homosexuals discharged under 32 C.F.R.
§ 41.13(c)(2) have claimed First Amendment violations.
210. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989). For a review of the facts of
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Amendment the Army's pre-"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy of discharging any soldier who "'by statements that they have a
homosexual orientation acknowledge a "desire" for homosexual conduct.' ,,211 Throughout its free speech analysis, the Ben-Shalom court
echoed the Brown rationale that the military may infringe on First
Amendment rights to a certain degree due to its unique mission of
national security.212 By tipping the scales in favor of the military at
the outset, the court easily concluded that the Army had reasonably
inferred that Ben-Shalom desired to engage in homosexual conduct
based on her admission.213 The court justified its ruling by stating that
"[w]e, as judges, although opponents of prejudice of any kind, should
not undertake to order such a risky change [of forcing the Army to
retain admitted homosexuals] with possible consequence[s] we cannot safely evaluate., 214 The court also supported its decision with the
assertion that the regulation did not prosecute speech per se, but
rather used Ben-Shalom's admission as legitimate evidence of her
self-identification as a lesbian. 215 Furthermore, while Ben-Shalom
could not "declare herself to be a homosexual" and remain in the
Army, she was still free to affiliate with any homosexual groups and
express her views about homosexuality without being separated, thus
Ben-Shalom, see supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
211. Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 459 (quoting the regulations issued pursuant to the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy). The court indicated that the previously objectionable
language-mandating discharge of soldiers "who 'evidence homosexual tendencies,
desire, or interest' "-had been eliminated. See id at 460 (quoting the regulations originally construed in Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 971 (E.D. Wis.
1980) (Ben-Shalom 1)). In contrast, the new regulations stated: "The presence in the
military environment of persons who engage in homosexual conduct, or who by their
statements demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impair
the accomplishment of the military mission." Id. at 459 (quoting Army Reg. 135-178,

§ 10-2).
212. See id at 458-60 (reviewing the holding of Brown with regard to First Amendment rights of service members); cf infra notes 263-77 and accompanying text
(demonstrating that the Thomasson majority tipped the balance in favor of the military by
granting broad judicial deference).
213. See Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 460.
214. Id at 461. The court feared that preventing the military from dismissing homosexuals "might imperil morale, discipline, and the effectiveness of our fighting forces."
Id.
215. See id. at 462 ("[I]t is the identity that makes her ineligible for military service,
not the speaking of it aloud."); accord Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260, 264 (D. Md.
1995), aff'd, 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). The court based its endorsement
of the evidentiary rationale on the Supreme Court's distinction between speech and nonspeech elements. See Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 462; see also United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (discussing this distinction). The court also found the Army
regulation to be legitimate under the four-prong O'Brien test. See Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d
at 462; supra note 195 (discussing the four prongs of the O'Brien test).
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further convincing the court that the regulation did not violate the
First Amendment.216 Thus, the court essentially engaged in a balancing test of Ben-Shalom's right to engage in speech about her
homosexuality and what it perceived as unacceptable risks to the
armed forces, ultimately concluding that the military's interests217 warranted greater protection than did the interests of Ben-Shalom.
The Seventh Circuit's decision to uphold anti-homosexual policies under the First Amendment in Ben-Shalom set a strong
precedent from which few courts have departed, as evidenced by the
decision in Cammermeyer v. Aspin.2 18 Although the court eventually
struck down the military's separation policy as contrary to the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment, it ruled that the policy did not violate the First Amendment after relatively little
discussion. 2 9 The Cammermeyer court relied not only on BenShalom, but also on Ninth Circuit precedent which had repeatedly
concluded that homosexuals were not being punished for their declarations of homosexuality, but rather, because their statements
provided evidence that they were likely to engage in homosexual
conduct.n Because Cammermeyer did not present any contrary
precedent, the court concluded that the military had not violated the
First Amendment by using Cammermeyer's speech as evidence that
she would engage in lesbian conduct• 1 The court's cursory review of
precedent on homosexual speech was in stark contrast to the prolific
and detailed investigation it conducted for the equalrotection claim,
under which it ultimately found for Cammermeyer.
In the cases after Cammenneyer, courts consistently denied First
Amendment claims of confessed homosexual service members who
were discharged, repeatedly concluding that the military could consti216. See Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 462; accord Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1163
(9th Cir. 1991) (opinion amended May 8,1992).
217. See Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 462. The district court in Selland v. Perry also used a
balancing test to uphold the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, arguing that the importance
of preserving the cohesion and effectiveness of the unit outweighed any incidental infringement on Selland's right to free speech. See Selland, 905 F. Supp. at 264.
218. 850 F. Supp. 910, 928 (W.D. Wash. 1994), appeal dismissed as moot and remanded, 97 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1996). For a review of the facts of Cammermeyer, see
supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
219. Compare Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 914-26 (considering the equal protection
claim), with id. at 928-29 (upholding the policy under the First Amendment).

220. See id. at 928-29 (citing Pruitt, 963 F.2d at 1163-64; Schowengerdt v. United
States, 944 F.2d 483, 489 (9th Cir. 1991)).

221. See id. at 929.
222. See supra notes 160-74 and accompanying text (setting forth the court's equal

protection analysis in Cammermeyer).
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tutionally use the statements of admission as evidence of a
"propensity" to engage in homosexual conduct.2 It was not until
Lieutenant Thorne challenged the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy in
Thorne v. United States Department of Defense2 24 that a court comprehensively explored the rationale for what had previously been
considered a foregone conclusion.2 Lieutenant Thorne was an exemplary officer who received awards for his outstanding academic
achievements and was at the top of his Navy flight school class. After Thorne publicly proclaimed his homosexuality,22 7 the Navy
instituted discharge proceedings against him.m However, pending
changes in the military's policy regarding homosexuals, Thorne was
reinstated until the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy became effective
in 1994.229 While waiting for an official hearing regarding his fate under the new policy, Lieutenant Thorne continued his exemplary
military performance and was even recommended for an early promotion.
The Navy subsequently reviewed Thorne's status under
the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy and discharged him pursuant to
223. See, e.g., Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260,263-65 (D. Md. 1995), affd, 100 F.3d
950 (4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); cf. Richenberg v. Perry, 73 F.3d 172, 172-73 (8th Cir.
1995) (denying injunction because the plaintiff did not have a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits for showing that the policy of using statements as evidence of a
"propensity" was unconstitutional). In Watson v. Perry, 918 F. Supp. 1403 (W.D. Wash.
1996), the court stated that the government could use the content of someone's speech for
evidentiary purposes provided there was a "connection between the information sought
and the government's interest." Id. at 1418.
224. 916 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Va. 1996).
225. See iL at 1364-65.
226. See id at 1361; cf. supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (discussing Lt. Thomasson's outstanding achievements).
227. Lieutenant Thorne sent a letter to his commanding officer revealing his homosexuality just hours before he publicly made his admission on the ABC television
broadcast "Nightline." See Thorne, 916 F. Supp. at 1361. Lieutenant Thorne was not the
first officer to admit his homosexuality on national television. See Meinhold v. United
States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994) (arising out of Meinhold's
declaration of his homosexuality on "ABC World News Tonight").
228. See Thorne, 916 F. Supp. at 1361-62.
229. See 1d&at 1362. Thorne's reinstatement occurred pursuant to an announcement
by the Assistant Secretary of Defense that any service members with discharge proceedings pending against them due to their sexual orientation would be reinstated and placed
on standby inactive reserve status during the transition between the two policies. See id.
The status of these soldiers would be subsequently reconsidered under the new policy.
See id.
230. See &eL at 1363. Thorne's commanding officer found him to have a "'leadership
vision [which] embraces the very qualities most sought after throughout the fleet.'" See
id.; cf. infra notes 289-90 and accompanying text (questioning the rationality of the argument that admitted homosexuals disrupt unit cohesion when officers, such as Thorne,
prove the opposite).
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10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2).231
Thorne's primary challenge to the new policy was that it constituted a violation of his right to free speech under the First
Amendment, both facially and as applied to him.232 The district court
first considered whether the statute was speech-based, which would
subject it to judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment, or conductbased, which would not implicate the First Amendment. 33 After
closely reviewing the wording of the statute, the court interpreted the
statutory term "propensity" to mean an "inclination" and concluded
that, standing alone, the statute would be facially invalid.23 Based on
this definition, the court deemed the statute a tautology, because
once a soldier admitted to having a homosexual orientation, nothing
short of a recantation of the admission could rebut the presumption
of homosexual conduct.235 Hence, because the presumption was essentially irrebuttable, the court found the statute in isolation to
constitute an unconstitutional restriction on speech. 236
The Thorne court, however, ultimately upheld the "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy because the court construed the statute with the
regulations in order to analyze the way the policy was imple-

231. See Thorne, 916 F. Supp. at 1362-63. Lieutenant Thorne attempted to rebut the
presumption of his "propensity" to engage in homosexual conduct by presenting witnesses who testified to his integrity and exemplary conduct. See id His commanding
officer and his roommate, who was also an officer, testified on his behalf, but the court
found this insufficient to rebut the presumption. See id
232. See id at 1361, 1364-72. The court also briefly considered whether it had jurisdiction to hear the case in light of the fact that Thorne had failed to exhaust all available
administrative remedies by challenging the constitutionality of the policy before the Navy
Board for Correction of Military Records (NBCMR) prior to filing suit. See id at 136364. After concluding that an administrative board may not be the appropriate forum for a
constitutional challenge and pointing out that the NBCMR may not even have the power
to strike down a statute as unconstitutional, the court held that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine was not applicable. See id. at 1364.
233. See id. at 1364.
234. See id at 1365. The Thorne court relied on dictionaries for its definition of
"propensity" as an "inclination." See id (listing several dictionaries which define
"propensity" as an "inclination" or "preference").
235. See id. See generally S. REP. No. 103-112, at 294 (1993) (providing the report of
the Senate Committee on Armed Forces regarding the rebuttability of the presumption).
236. See Thorne, 916 F. Supp. at 1365. To make an adequate rebuttal, for instance, a
soldier would have to say he had made the statement jokingly. See id at 1365 n.6. If the
policy were found not to restrict speech, but merely to use the speech as evidence triggering investigation into conduct, there would be no First Amendment problem. See id at
1367-68. Thus, to evaluate the constitutionality of the policy as applied, the court assumed arguendo that the policy constituted a speech restriction rather than a conduct
restriction. See id. at 1368.
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mented?' 7 Unlike the statute's implicit definition of "propensity" as
an "inclination," the regulations explicitly define "propensity" as a
"likelihood," thereby feasibly allowing gay and lesbian service members to rebut the presumption of homosexuality without retracting
prior admissions.236' Consequently, the court determined that the tautology disappeared in light of the regulatory interpretation of the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy and refrained from finding the policy
facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 39
The court then reviewed Thorne's claim that the policy, as applied to him, violated his free speech rights by first examining
whether the restriction was content-based or content-neutral. 4 The
fact that the policy targeted homosexual statements such as "I am
gay," but did not affect similar proclamations of heterosexual orientation, prompted the court to classify the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy as content-based. 241 The court struggled with the next phase of
First Amendment analysis-determining the appropriate standard of
review-because while most content-based restrictions are subject to
strict scrutiny, it was well-established that military action normally
invokes a lower standard of deferential review.242 As a compromise,
237. See id. at 1366; DOD Directive 1332.30, at 1-1 (1993).
238. See Thorne, 916 F. Supp. at 1366. But cf. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 943 (Luttig, J.,
concurring) (citing H.R. REP. No. 103-200, at 289 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2013, 2076) (criticizing the regulations' definition as creating a haven for admitted gay
soldiers to remain in the military, contrary to congressional intent).
239. See Thorne, 916 F. Supp. at 1366-67. Nevertheless, the court deferred making an
ultimate decision regarding the practical enforcement of the policy until the exact scope
of the statute and regulations was established; the court noted that the record at bar did
not contain enough information to permit a definitive conclusion regarding whether the
regulations provided a homosexual with the opportunity to rebut the "propensity" presumption. See id. at 1366. The court expressed doubts that the government would
implement the presumption consistently with the court's interpretation of the regulations
and, therefore, analyzed the constitutionality of the statute as if it were a restriction on
speech. See id. at 1367-72.
On remand, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held
that, in light of Thomasson, the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy validly uses speech as
evidence and, therefore, is content-neutral. See Thorne v. United States Dep't of Defense, 945 F. Supp. 924, 926 (E.D. Va. 1996) (mem.). The district court stated that the
presumption of homosexuality is rebuttable without recanting an admission, as evidenced
by numerous cases so holding. See id. at 927-28. Consequently, Thorne's claim that his
discharge violated the First Amendment failed. See id. at 930.
240. See Thorne, 916 F. Supp. at 1368-69. Content-neutral restrictions focus on controlling the secondary effects of the speech, while content-based restrictions concern the
ideas or views that are the subject of the speech. See id. at 1368.
241. See id. at 1368-69. The court also dismissed as too tenuous the government's attempts to argue that it was only interested in the "secondary effects" that the admissions
would have on unit cohesion. See id. at 1368.
242. See id at 1369-70; see also supra note 130 (describing the requirements for each
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the court applied a diluted version of heightened scrutiny, so that
"instead of being 'necessary' to the achievement of government objectives the 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' plan need only 'substantially
further' those goals." 243 Despite this accommodation, the court concluded that the government still failed to adequately prove the policy
"substantially furthered" its three asserted goals of preserving privacy, reducing sexual tensions, and maintaining unit cohesion. 2"
Foremost, the court deduced that a policy which merely discourages
homosexuals from revealing their sexuality would not prevent gays
from anonymously serving among the ranks of heterosexual soldiers;
thus, the tension between the two groups would still persist.245 Likewise, the court disagreed that the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy
minimizes sexual tension enough .to warrant the exclusion of gay
service members, because it permits silent homosexuals-who will
experience the same unconsummated sexual tension as declared homosexuals-to remain in the military.24' Finally, the court concluded
that the homosexual orientation of a soldier would no more polarize
a unit than a soldier who openly advocates homosexual rights, something that the policy permits. 247 Thus, the Thorne court held that both
the statute and the regulations failed to meet the necessary standard
of review for military action constituting a content-based restriction
on speech, thereby becoming the first court to determine that the
military policy against homosexuals violates the First Amendment. 24
standard of review). The court had no precedential guidance, as no court had ever evaluated a content-based restriction in the military. See Thorne, 916 F. Supp. at 1369.
243. Thorne, 916 F. Supp. at 1370; cf.Elzie v. Aspin, 897 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1995)
(noting that the appropriate standard of review under the First Amendment would more
likely be heightened scrutiny than rational relation scrutiny).
244. See Thorne, 916 F. Supp. at 1370-72 (setting forth the three goals of the government); cf. Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 922-24 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(describing eight goals the government claimed were furthered by the policy against homosexuals), appealdismissed as moot and remanded,97 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1996).
245. See Thorne, 916 F. Supp. at 1371.
246. See id at 1372. The court recognized that sexual tension could potentially harm
unit cohesion, but implied that the sexual tension created by admitting gays and lesbians
was no different than the sexual tension created by allowing heterosexual men and
women to serve together. See id. at 1371-72. ("Indeed, it is for this reason, in part, that
the military provides separate barracks for men and women.").
247. See id. at 1372; cf.Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 461-62 (7th Cir. 1989)
(upholding a lesbian's discharge against a First Amendment challenge because she was
still permitted to voice her views on homosexuality). The Thorne court also rationalized
that a unit could become polarized over several other issues, including religion and race,
both of which were protected in the military. See Thorne, 916 F. Supp. at 1372 n.12.
248. See Thorne, 916 F. Supp. at 1372. The Thorne decision was reinforced by Holmes
v. CaliforniaArmy National Guard,920 F. Supp. 1510 (N.D. Cal. 1996), in which the court
reasoned that to allow the military to discharge homosexuals merely for admitting their
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Thomasson v. Perry was decided at a time when a growing minority of courts were minimizing the importance of judicial deference
and more actively investigating the constitutionality of the exclusionary military policy under the First and Fifth Amendments. Perhaps
perceiving this trend as a threat to the traditional respect for the
separation of powers, the Fourth Circuit dedicated the greater part of
the Thomasson opinion to reaffirming the importance of accordin
substantial judicial deference to the military and the legislature.
The court defined its limited role by noting the lack of enumerated
judicial powers in the Constitution with respect to military affairs,2 l
and interpreting this absence as commanding the courts to defer to
the other branches of governmental power. 2' The Fourth Circuit
sexual orientation would "render hollow" the policy's promise that a soldier's "'sexual
orientation.., is not a bar to service entry or continued service.'" See id. at 1535-36
(quoting DOD Directive 1332.30, at 2-1 (1994) (emphasis added by the Holmes court)).
Thus, the Holmes court held that the policy "discriminating against homosexuals violates
plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment." Id. at 1536.
249. In addition, there was a growing inconsistency in decisions not just between circuits, but also among district courts within the same circuit. Compare Thorne, 916 F.
Supp. at 1372 (holding the policy would violate the First Amendment rights of gay soldiers if implemented so as to render the presumption of homosexual conduct
irrebuttable), with Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260, 265 (D. Md. 1995) (finding the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy did not infringe on the soldier's right to free speech under
the First Amendment by reasoning that the protections of the First Amendment are more
relaxed in the military context), affd, 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). Though
Thorne and Selland both arose in district courts within the Fourth Circuit, Thomasson was
the first case to reach the Fourth Circuit regarding exclusion of homosexuals from the
military, and the court heard the case en banc.
250. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 921-27. For a general review of judicial deference
accorded in military cases in the past and a discussion of whether restrictions that would
be unconstitutional in civilian life can be justified in the military setting, see generally
Hirschhorn, supra note 1. The political basis for the separation policy for homosexual
soldiers has become significant under the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy due to President
Clinton's highly profiled involvement in homosexual issues. See, e.g., Thorne, 916 F.
Supp. at 1362-63 (identifying President Clinton's influence in the promulgation of the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy and Congress's reaction thereto).
251. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 924; see also supra note 113 (reviewing the respective
powers of the legislative and executive branches, and observing that the Constitution does
not grant the judiciary any power over the military). The Fourth Circuit indicated that it
was the Framers' intent to allow the military to defend the nation without being subject to
the "constitutional shackle" of the courts. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 924 (citing THE
FEDERALIST No. 23, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (Mentor ed., 1961)). Other decisions
in which courts refer to the text of the Constitution to minimize their role in military matters include Selland v. Perry,905 F. Supp. 260,265 (D. Md. 1995), affd, 100 F.3d 950 (4th
Cir. 1996) (per curiam); and Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 915 (W.D. Wash.
1994), appealdismissed as moot andremanded,97 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1996).
252. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 925. The Fourth Circuit also followed the majority of
decisions by relying on the substantial judicial precedent granting deference to the military. See id at 926; see also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,743-44 (1974) (citing precedent
recognizing the unique role of the military and the need to defer to its judgment on inter-
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also emphasized the sanctity of the separation of powers, reviewing
the formulation of the "sustained and delicate negotiations" 'z' 3 between Congress and the Executive that surrounded the "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy.24 Upon completing this detailed history of the
policy, the Fourth Circuit stated that only a "clear constitutional
mandate" that the legislative findings were wrong would prompt it to
"set aside these lengthy labors of the legislative process and supplant
with [its] own judicial judgment the product of a serious and prolonged debate on a subject of paramount national importance." 5
Thus, in the tradition of deference to the military, which has been a
consistent judicial theme in cases challenging military policies, the
Fourth Circuit explicitly established its intent at the outset to defer
significantly to the military in the debate over gays and lesbians in the
armed forces.5 6
The Fourth Circuit focused on the separation of powers doctrine,
adopting a relatively conservative position on the constitutional issues associated with the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. Judicial
deference permeated almost every aspect of the opinion, beginning
with the court's review of Thomasson's equal protection challenge.
nal matters); Richenberg v. Perry, 73 F.3d 172, 173 (8th Cir. 1995) (relying on prior decisions ddferring to the military); cf Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (relying
substantially on historical tradition in decision regarding homosexual rights).
253. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 921. The court characterized the policy as a "carefully
crafted national political compromise." Id.
254. See id at 921-23; see also id. at 937-39 (Luttig, J., concurring) (reviewing the legislative and executive involvement in the evolution of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy). The Thomasson court was unique in its attention to legislative history. Cf Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 920 F. Supp. 1510, 1515-17 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(covering the elements of the policy, but making no reference to the congressional investigations); Watson v. Perry, 918 F. Supp. 1403, 1410-11 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (failing to
mention Congress's role in forming the policy when discussing military deference);
Thorne v. United States Dep't of Defense, 916 F. Supp. 1358, 1362 (E.D. Va. 1996)
(outlining briefly the procedural history of the policy), opinion supplemented by 945 F.
Supp. 924, 926 (E.D. Va. 1996) (mem.); Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260, 262 (D. Md.
1995) (reviewing the legislative history of the policy in one paragraph), affd, 100 F.3d 950
(4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
255. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 923. The court that came the closest to echoing this sentiment was the United States District Court for Maryland in Selland, which stated: "[T]his
Court is convinced it should not revisit the findings that underlie the 'Don't Ask Don't
Tell' policy and must defer to the military's decision that its unique mission of maintaining readiness for armed conflict requires initiation of separation proceedings at the
earliest possible moment." Selland, 905 F. Supp. at 265.
256. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 927 (finding it necessary to accord "special deference"
to the military before conducting any constitutional analysis).
257. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 927-31. The equal protection challenge was Thomasson's most viable ground for attack, given that prior courts were not nearly as united in
holding that the policy does not violate the Fifth Amendment as they were in agreeing
that the policy does not violate the First Amendment. Compare supra notes 134-92 and
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Though the court predictably joined the majority of jurisdictions in
applying rational basis review, it deviated from the traditional justification for adopting a lower standard of constitutional review by
relying on judicial deference.'5 The court refused to consider homosexuals a suspect class in part because" 'respect for the separation of
powers' should make courts reluctant to establish new suspect
classes"25 9 and "[t]his reluctance has even more force when the intense judicial scrutiny would be applied to the 'specialized society' of
the military.",260 The Fourth Circuit's primary reliance on separation
of powers to justify rational basis review was relatively unique; other
courts have reached the same conclusion by relying solely on precedent,21 or interpreting the policy as conduct-based rather than statusbased.262
The Fourth Circuit also refused to recognize consensual homosexuality as a fundamental right, because it "would involve the
judiciary in an inventive constitutional enterprise and would frustrate
the elected branches of government in their efforts to deal with this
question. '"2 While most courts have reached the same conclusion
regarding fundamental rights for gays, they primarily have done so by
accompanying text (examining decisions under the Fifth Amendment), with supra notes
210-48 and accompanying text (reviewing the First Amendment challenges to the homosexual separation policy).
258. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 927-28. Courts have only considered heightened scrutiny with regard to First Amendment challenges. See Thorne, 916 F. Supp. at 1369-72;
Elzie v. Aspin, 897 F. Supp. 1, 5 (N.D. Cal. 1996). See generally Krygowski, supra note 7,
at 895-905 (reviewing pre-Thomasson decisions with regard to the applied standard of
review).
259. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 928 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,

Inc., 473 U.S. 432,441 (1985)).

260. Id. (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974)).
261. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,573-74
(9th Cir. 1990) (refusing to classify homosexuals as a suspect class because, while there is
a history of discrimination, homosexuality is not an immutable characteristic and homosexuals are not without political power to remedy their situation). High Tech Gays
commanded the use of rational review in subsequent cases within the Ninth Circuit. See
Watson v. Perry, 918 F. Supp. 1403, 1412 (W.D. Wash. 1996); Cammermeyer v. Aspin,
850 F. Supp. 910, 914 (W.D. Wash. 1994), appeal dismissed as moot and remanded,97 F.3d
1235 (9th Cir. 1996).
262. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) (concluding that homosexuals are not a suspect class and the Army regulations did not discharge gays and
lesbians merely based on their status, but on reasonable inferences from their conduct).
A conduct-based policy would require the military to discharge homosexuals based solely
on homosexual conduct, whereas a status-based policy would permit discharge based on a
soldier's homosexual orientation. Because a status-based policy may unconstitutionally
target a group based solely on its members' mental states, such a policy may justify application of heightened scrutiny. See id.
263. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 928.
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relying on the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize consensual homosexuality as part of the fundamental right to privacy under the
Due Process Clause in Bowers v. Hardwick. Therefore, the Fourth
Circuit took a different approach than the majority of courts addressing the issue by grounding its conclusions on the structural
distribution of powers and judicial deference to the military and legprecedent of the Supreme
islature,
2 rather than on the controlling
Court. 6
The court's refusal to interfere with military matters, coupled
with the fact that the claim was considered under the most deferential standard of equal protection review, had a significant impact on
Thomasson's burden of proof to rebut the presumption that his declaration of homosexuality translated into a "propensity" to engage in
homosexual conduct. The court deemed the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy to be "entitled to 'a strong presumption of validity'" and
stated that "'[t]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support
it.' "'66 Insofar as this heavy burden of proof is commensurate with
that applied by the majority of courts deciding the equal protection
rights of gay and lesbian soldiers, the Thomasson court's decision to
267
impose such a burden appears to be consistent with judicial trends.
However, because the Fourth Circuit openly conceded that it would
accord the military maximum deference, the court further added to
Thomasson's burden, claiming that " '[t]he special status of the mili264. See Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464 (citing Bowers as authority for not categorizing
homosexuals as a suspect class); Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260, 265 (D. Md. 1995)

(relying on Bowers to conclude that "there is no infringement of a 'fundamental right' in
[this] case"), affd, 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
265. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 921-27 (focusing on the distinct roles of each branch,
and the resulting need for deference to the military). In taking this approach, the court
established an additional ground for judicial nonintervention in military decisions and
confirmed that gay and lesbian soldiers are unlikely to succeed in invoking heightened
constitutional scrutiny under either due process or equal protection rationales. The fact

that heterosexual soldiers are permitted to engage in heterosexual activities off-duty
seems to unconstitutionally discriminate against homosexuals as a class. Cf.Holmes v.
California Army Nat'l Guard, 920 F. Supp. 1510, 1530 n.20 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ("There is no
evidence that homosexuals are any less capable of controlling their desires than heterosexuals.").
266. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 928 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 318-19, 320

(1993)).
267. See Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260,266 (D. Md. 1995) ("[T]he party attacking

the law must bear the burden of negating all possible justifications whether or not found
in the record."), affd, 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Cammermeyer v. Aspin,
850 F. Supp. 910, 922 (W.D. Wash. 1994) ("Under Heller ...the burden is on the plaintiff
'to negative every conceivable basis which might support' the government's policy."),
appeal dismissed as moot and remanded,97 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1996).
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tary has required, the Constitution has contemplated, Congress has
created, and [the Supreme] Court has long recognized' that constitutional challenges2 to military personnel policies and decisions face
8
heavy burdens.
In addition to the heavy burden imposed on Thomasson, the
court hindered his ability to prove his case by excusing the government from presenting any "empirical evidence" to support the
allegation that the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.269 This stance directly
conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's requirement in Pruitt that the government provide more than mere speculation to justify the antihomosexual policy, since to do otherwise would essentially render
judicial review obsolete. 20 Instead, the Fourth Circuit echoed the
more lenient stance of the Seventh Circuit, accepting the military's
judgment on the separation policy as ample evidence to overcome
the plaintiffs challenge. 27 Overall, the substantial burden placed on
homosexual soldiers coupled with the considerable judicial deference
to the military implies that the Fourth Circuit advocated a "passive"
rather than "active" rational basis review of the equal protection
claims 2 thereby making it nearly impossible for Thomasson to tri26& Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 927 (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 303-04
(1983)). The court also wrote: "To the extent that our renouncement of the accepted
policy would require adoption of [policies that were rejected by Congress and the President], the damage inflicted by judicial decree on democratic decisionmaking "ill have
been immense." Id.
269. See ic at 928 ("To sustain the validity of its policy, the government is not required to provide empirical evidence.").
270. See Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 1991) (opinion amended
May 8, 1992). In Cammermeyer, the court followed the Ninth Circuit's position and found
that the government had failed to present rationalizations that Cammermeyer could not
rebut. See Cainmerneyer,850 F. Supp. at 926.
271. See Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 922 ("fT]he burden is on the plaintiff 'to negative every conceivable basis which might support' the government's policy." (quoting
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993))); see also Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454,
465 (7th Cir. 1989) (accepting the military's justifications for excluding homosexuals as
special "military considerations [that] should be left to the Army").
272. A relaxed rational review standard is predisposed toward the military because the
court assumes the policy is a legitimate means to a rational end and relieves the government of its burden of proof on that point. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (requiring only that there is some "plausible" reason for
upholding a statute under rational basis review, even if the actual reason is discriminatory). This contrasts with the "active" rational review standard, which would have
favored Thomasson because the court would be assuming the policy violated his constitutional rights and shift the burden to the military to prove that it was legitimate. Cf. City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446-48, 450 (1985) (striking down
a housing ordinance requiring special permits for group homes for the mentally retarded
as an unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause under an "active" rational
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umph on equal protection grounds. 27
Judicial deference to the military also colored the Fourth Circuit's assessment of whether the statute serves a legitimate
governmental purpose under the rational review standard.274 The
court considered it rational for the military to presume that proclaimed gays and lesbians would engage in homosexual conduct, and
therefore disrupt the unit, based on remarks at the congressional
hearings that "'[i]t would be irrational... to develop military personnel policies on the basis that all gays and lesbians will remain
celibate.' ,275 While many courts have expressed similar concerns
that homosexual conduct may disrupt the cohesion of a military unit,
the Ninth Circuit has cast some doubt on these findings, speculating
that "at least a serious question is raised whether it can ever be rational to presume that one class of persons (identified by their sexual
preference alone) will violate regulations whereas another class
(identified by their preference) will not."276 The Fourth Circuit, however, unquestioningly accepted the legislative findings as correct and
dispelled any concerns that the findings may not be altogether accurate by stating that "'courts are compelled ... to accept a
legislature's generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends.' ,27 Thus, the Fourth Circuit accepted
possible inaccuracies in the findings underlying the "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy, deeming such imperfections permissible within
the parameters of military policy.
The Fourth Circuit's position on the validity of the congressional
findings enumerated in 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)-that it is legitimate to
basis review because the city was unable to meet the standard).
273. Few plaintiffs have been successful in overcoming this burden of proof even without the added burden of judicial deference. Compare Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 924
(finding the plaintiff met the burden of proving that her discharge violated her equal protection rights), with Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260, 266 (D. Md. 1995) (finding the
plaintiff had not met the burden of proof necessary to rebut the presumption of homosexual conduct), affd, 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
274. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 928-31.

at 930 (quoting S. REP.No. 103-112, at 284 (1993)). The court found the
275. See id.
presumption to be favorable from an administrative viewpoint, since it eliminated much
of the burden of conducting an investigation into the soldier's background and shifted the
burden onto the declarant. See id.
276. Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1478 (9th Cir. 1994).
The court in Cammermeyer found that there was no validity to the rationale that homosexuals were more likely to engage in sexual activity than heterosexuals; in fact, it cited
expert testimony indicating gays and lesbians are less likely to engage in sexual conduct
while in the military than their heterosexual counterparts. See Cammermeyer, 850 F.

Supp. at 919.
277. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 930 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,321 (1993)).
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separate openly gay soldiers on the basis of these findings27-is perhaps best evinced by the court's reaction to the debate over whether
gays in the military pose an "unacceptable risk" to the effectiveness
of the unit.279 The "risk" argument is not a novel one, as several
courts have upheld the policy based on the conclusion that allowing
declared homosexuals to remain on duty poses a threat to the effectiveness of the military.m However, other courts have explicitly and
implicitly questioned the validity of the legislative findings that gays
pose a risk to the effectiveness of the military. For example, the
Cammermeyer court closely examined each of the military's rationales for the separation policy, many of which paralleled Congress's
conclusions about the disruptive effect of gays in the military, and
concluded they could be successfully rebutted. m The fact that the
Cammermeyer court dismissed the findings that gays present an
"unacceptable risk" to the military suggests that the validity of those
findings is subject to attack, casting doubt as to whether courts should
accept them as conclusive. While Thomasson did not present evi278. The Fourth Circuit specifically relied on 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(7) (1994) (stating that
homosexuality threatens the bonds of trust among the unit), id § 654(a)(12) (concluding
that conditions of forced intimacy in the military exacerbate the tension of homosexuality), id § 654(a)(13) (stating that homosexuality has traditionally been disfavored in the
military), and id § 654(a)(15) (finding that gays create an "unacceptable risk" to morale
and unit cohesion). See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 929; see also 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1)-(15)
(stating the congressional findings in support of a homosexual separation policy).
279. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 928-29. Congress enumerated its bases for maintaining a policy that separates homosexuals from the armed forces in 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1)(15). The court also cited the testimony of Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf that the
retention of announced gays and lesbians would be detrimental to the unity of the armed
forces and, consequently, to national security. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 929 (citing Policy ConcerningHomosexuality in the Armed Forces: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Armed Servs., 103d Cong. 708 (1993) (statement of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Colin L. Powell); id. at 280 (statement of General H. Norman
Schwarzkopf)).
280. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454,461 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Ihe Army should
not be required by this court to assume the risk, a risk it would be assuming for all our
citizens, that accepting admitted homosexuals into the armed forces might imperil morale,
discipline, and the effectiveness of our fighting forces."); see also Selland v. Perry, 905 F.
Supp. 260,265 (D. Md. 1995) ("It would be improper for this Court to rule that the Navy
should have retained Selland on the crew until he committed a homosexual act after Selland stated that he was homosexual in the close confines of an attack submarine."), arfd,
100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); cf. Brown v. Gines, 444 U.S. 348,353-58 (1980)
(considering the solicitation of signatures for an anti-war petition to pose a substantial
risk to the order and discipline of the unit).
281. See Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 922-26. For a review of the numerous asserted
government rationales that Cammermeyer successfully rebutted, see supra notes 169-74
and accompanying text. While the case was not adjudicated under the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy, the government in Cammermeyer did cite 10 U.S.C. § 654(a) as support for
its position. See Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 921.
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dence as extensive as Cammermeyer'sm the Fourth Circuit opted not
to address the potential discrepancies in the findings on gays in the
military.m
Since the Thomasson court failed to acknowledge the more obvious and direct attacks on the policy, it is not surprising that it also
overlooked the problems with the policy that have been more subtly
identified by some courts. In Selland, the plaintiff claimed that the
justifications for the policy reflected in 10 U.S.C. § 654(a) "are all derived from hatred and prejudice held by heterosexuals toward
homosexuals" and, therefore, were illegitimate. Rather than specifically dismissing these allegations, the Selland court found that
Selland had failed to meet his burden in attacking the constitutionality of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" polic% because he had not negated
all of its possible supporting rationales. The Selland court's failure
to address the soldier's claims of hatred and prejudice could imply
that the court agreed they were viable challenges to the policy. Nevertheless, there is no mention of such an inference in the Thomasson
decision, as the majority apparentl ignored the decisions of lower
courts that conflict with its holding.
Only the dissent criticized the legislative findings in support of
the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, as Judge Hall voiced his concern
that the military is unwarranted in its assumption that homosexuals
will disrupt unit cohesion.m Judge Hall attempted to dispel the ma282. Compare Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 921 (listing the evidence Thomasson presented
in his defense, including expert testimony on the meaning of homosexuality), with Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 922-24 (reviewing numerous sources, including official surveys
and reports, that support the argument that gays and lesbians are not a threat to unit cohesion).
283. Instead, the Fourth Circuit merely dismissed Thomasson's evidence by stating
that "Itihe general evidence offered at his discharge hearing had no bearing on this particular question." Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 930.
284. Selland, 905 F. Supp. at 266.
285. See id.;
see also Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (stating that private
biases displayed toward a child living with a stepparent of another race are not permissi-

ble grounds to remove an infant from his natural mother's custody); Cammermeyer, 850
F. Supp. at 924 ("An examination of the record demonstrates that the sole motivation for
the exclusion of acknowledged homosexuals from military service is prejudice.").
286. See Selland, 905 F. Supp. at 266. The court agreed that there were instances, such
as in Camnermeyer,where the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence of the prejudicial undertones of the policy to render its application unconstitutional as applied to him.

See id.
287. The United States District Court for Maryland, which decided Cammermeyer, is
within the Fourth Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994). However, the Fourth Circuit is not
under any obligation to address lower court decisions that may be inconsistent with its
holdings.
288. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 951-52 (Hall, J., dissenting).
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jority's perception that gays and lesbians pose a threat to the unit by
stressing that outstanding officers, such as Lieutenant Thomasson,
continued to command their units after revealing their homosexuality
with the same effectiveness as they had prior to their admissions.
But Judge Hall's attempts were futile, as the majority simply noted
that "[a]ny argument that Congress was misguided in this view is one
of legislative policy, not constitutional law."2'0 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's adherence to the doctrine of separation of powers and its
deference to Congress and the military prevented the court from considering
several potential arguments against the legitimacy of the
291
policy.

The Fourth Circuit took a different approach to Thomasson's
First Amendment claim than it had with the equal protection challenge, shifting to a focus on precedent rather than relying solely on
legislative findings and judicial deference. 292 In accord with the majority of courts, the Fourth Circuit accepted the government's
"evidentiary argument" that the policy did not discriminate against
the content of speech,293 concluding that "a service member's state289. See id.at 952 & n.7 (Hall, J., dissenting) ("[Thomasson's] sexual orientation had
no adverse effect on [his peers] or to the Navy. With so few good naval officers, the Navy
should definitely keep LT PAUL THOMASSON."); see also Thorne v. United States
Dep't of Defense, 916 F. Supp. 1358, 1363 (E.D. Va. 1996) (finding that upon returning to
duty as an admitted homosexual, Thorne "proved to be an outstanding officer, performing his duties in exemplary fashion... [and that] his 'accomplishments [were]
unparalleled' and.., his 'leadership vision embrace[d] the very qualities most sought
after throughout the fleet.' "), opinion supplemented by 945 F. Supp. 924, 926 (E.D. Va.
1996) (mem.). Judge Hall further argued that Thomasson's presence forced several of his
peers to reconsider their views on homosexuals, thereby decreasing the homophobia in
his unit. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 952 (Hall, J., dissenting).
290. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 929.
291. The court also found it rational to separate proclaimed homosexuals from the
military before they engaged in any homosexual conduct, as "[n]o constitutional constraint prohibits the military from preventing acts that would threaten combat capability."
Id.Other decisions, such as Ben-Shalom, have ruled similarly in this regard, finding that
the military was warranted in interpreting a homosexual admission as a sign of homosexual conduct. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989); see also
Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1478 n.11 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We
acknowledge the force of DOD's argument that it need not take the risk of a person with
homosexual desire or propensity acting on it because of the critical nature of the military
mission.").
292. Thomasson claimed that the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy violated his First
Amendment rights both facially and as applied to him, alleging that the military discharged him solely based on his speech and that speech-based restrictions are
unconstitutional. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 930. Only two courts have found that the
policy violates the First Amendment. See Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 920 F.
Supp. 1510, 1534-36 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Thorne, 916 F. Supp. at 1372.
293. The basis of this "evidentiary argument" is that a soldier's statements of self-
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ment that he is a homosexual has substantial evidentiary value regarding whether he has a propensity to engage in homosexual acts." 294
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion is further supported by the extensive
judicial decisions confirming the proposition that the military can
constitutionally use speech as evidence.
Inevitably, the undercurrent of judicial deference to the military
resurfaced during the court's free speech discussion. While the court
continued to rely on separation of powers as the basis of this deference, it also derived substantial support for its position from First
Amendment precedent.2 For example, the court cited the Supreme
Court's conclusion that "'review of military regulations challenged
on First Amendment grounds [is] far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian
society.' ,,"29
The Supreme Court has also found that soldiers "have
never possessed all the First Amendment rights of the civilian population" due to the military's unique mission and need of maintaining
unit cohesion. Thus, the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the policy
identification as gay or lesbian are not used to exclude the soldier based on that sexual
status; rather, they are used as evidence that the proclaimed homosexual has a propensity
to engage in homosexual conduct. See Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir.
1991) (opinion amended May 8, 1992); Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 928
(W.D. Wash. 1994), appeal dismissed as moot and remanded,97 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1996).
294. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 932. The court also stated that "[t]here is no constitutional
impediment, therefore, to the use of speech as relevant evidence of facts that may furnish
a permissible basis for separation from military service." 1d. at 931. The court could have
followed the Seventh Circuit in Ben-Shalom and applied the O'Brien test to determine if
the government's policy was a constitutional restriction on speech. See Ben-Shalom, 881
F.2d at 462. For a review of the four prongs of the O'Brientest, see supra note 195.
295. See Pruitt, 963 F.2d at 1164 (upholding a service member's discharge under the
First Amendment by finding it permissible to use the speech as evidence); Watson v.
Perry, 918 F. Supp. 1403, 1418 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (citing the district court decision in
Thomasson as support for using speech as evidence, since it can be used as evidence in the
criminal context); Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260, 264 (D. Md. 1995) ("Just as a jury
might infer a criminal violation from statements of the accused, the Navy infers prohibited homosexual acts from admissions of homosexuality."), aff'd, 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir.
1996) (per curiam); see also Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 928 (upholding the military's
use of Cammermeyer's statement as proof of her homosexuality based on precedent).
296. Compare this reliance on precedent to the court's equal protection analysis,
where it appeared to rely on the doctrine of separation of powers rather than on precedent that might have led the court to a different result. See supra notes 249-91 and
accompanying text.
297. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 933 (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507
(1986)); see also Holmes, 920 F. Supp. at 1535 (adhering to Goldman in military-related
First Amendment claim).
298. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 933 (citing Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507); see also Parker v.
Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) ("While the members of the military are not excluded
from the protection granted by the First Amendment, the different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those
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is content-neutral and, therefore, nondiscriminatory, appears to be
commensurate with the Supreme Court's past deference to the military.2 9 The Fourth Circuit accepted the military's argument that the
policy was primarily concerned with the secondary effects of the
speech, such as unit disruption, rather than Thomasson's actual
statement that he was gay." The majority's willingness to accept this
proposition without much evidence conforms with other decisions
that have reached the same conclusion with little controversy. 3 ' Ultimately, the Thomasson court concluded that the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy, in spite of its potential to chill the speech of gay and lesbian soldiers, is "an allowable means of furthering the nation's
military mission. ' '
In its analysis of the policy under the First Amendment, the
Fourth Circuit relied on both precedent and judicial deference to the
military, though precedent alone would have sufficed. One explanation for this may be that the court recognized the potential
implications of Thome, which found the statute, standing alone, to be
unconstitutional under the First Amendment, but still upheld the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy because of the mitigating effect of the
regulatory definition of "propensity" as a "likelihood."' ' Though the
protections."); Watson, 918 F. Supp. at 1417 (reasoning that the differences between military and civilian life warranted a less stringent application of the First Amendment to the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy).
299. Cf. Parker,417 U.S. at 743-44 (expressing substantial judicial deference to the
military).
300. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 932-34. The court also agreed with other courts that
the policy was not unconstitutionally viewpoint-based, since soldiers were still allowed to
express their views on homosexuality and affiliate with gays and lesbians. See id. at 932;
see also Pruitt,963 F.2d at 1163 (supporting the conclusion that the policy was not content-based because soldiers may still express their views on the subject of homosexuality)
(citing Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 462 (7th Cir. 1989)). But see Holmes, 920 F.
Supp. at 1535 ("Here, there is no legitimate dispute that the Act and Directives are content-based, as they target service members who acknowledge their homosexuality.");
Elzie v. Aspin, 897 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1995) (implying that anti-homosexual military
policies could be viewpoint-based).
301. See, e.g., Pruitt, 963 F.2d at 1163 ("Pruitt was discharged not for the content of
her speech, but for being a homosexual."); cf. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508
(1986) (upholding the military's right to impose a uniform dress code under the First
Amendment based on the need for uniformity within the unit to preserve order); Brown
v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354-55 (1980) (upholding the military's speech restriction based
on the substantial governmental interests of maintaining military loyalty, discipline, and
morale).
302. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 934; see also Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 459 (accepting that
the military may have to "chill[J" speech for the benefit of the unit).
303. See Thorne v. United States Dep't of Defense, 916 F. Supp. 1358, 1368 (E.D. Va.
1996) (finding the statements provision to be a content-based restriction), opinion supplemented by 945 F. Supp. 924, 926 (E.D. Va. 1996) (mem.). The Thorne court essentially
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Fourth Circuit is not obligated to follow lower court decisions,3' 4 the
Thorne opinion may explain, in part, why the Thomasson majority
implicitly adopted the regulatory definition of "propensity" as a
"likelihood," rather than endorsing Judge Luttg's emphatic asserBy employing the
tion that the term be defined as an "inclination."
"likelihood" definition, the court was able to find the policy content-

neutral,3 and avoid construing the policy as an impermissible content-based restriction.' °8 Overall, however, the majority avoided any
direct discussion regarding the potential conflict between the regulatory and statutory definitions of "propensity" by upholding the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy primarily based on judicial deference.3
Judge Luttig, joined by five judges, reprimanded the majority for
even entertaining the regulatory definition of "propensity" as
The concur"likelihood" as a valid interpretation of the statute.
found that the statutory interpretation of "propensity" as an "inclination" rendered it a
tautology, while the regulations' more conservative interpretation of "propensity" as a
"likelihood" rendered the presumption feasibly rebuttable. See supra notes 224-48 and
accompanying text (discussing the Thorne decision in greater detail).
304. The Fourth Circuit is comprised of the following states: Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994). Thus, the
Eastern District of Virginia, the court deciding Thorne, is controlled by the Fourth Circuit's holding in Thomasson v. Perry.
305. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 932. The court cited Steffan v. Perry,41 F.3d 677, 686
(D.C. Cir. 1994), which stated that "'the military may reasonably assume that when a
member states that he is a homosexual, that member means that he either engages or is
likely to engage in homosexual conduct.'" Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 932 (emphasis added).
306. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (outlining Judge Luttig's argument
that the statutory definition of "propensity" should control).
307. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 932-34. The majority apparently thought that interpreting "propensity" as a "likelihood" was exactly what the legislature intended, stating:
Congress expressly found that the statute at issue here was justified on grounds
relating to performance of the military function ... [and thus] the use of statements of one's homosexuality as evidence of a propensity or intent to engage in
homosexual acts is justifiable under the standards associated with contentneutral military rules.
Id. at 933.
308. See Thorne, 916 F. Supp. at 1365.
309. The Fourth Circuit found it a "sensible inference" to presume a soldier would
engage in homosexual conduct based on his declaration of homosexuality; this conclusion,
however, does not indicate whether the presumption is one of homosexual "inclination"
or tendency. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 930. Likewise, the court did not commit to a
definition of "propensity" when it noted the illogical presumption that all homosexuals in
the military would abstain from homosexual conduct. See id.
310. See iL at 934-49 (Luttig, J., concurring); see also supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (providing a general overview of Judge Luttig's arguments). The fact that five
of the nine judges upholding the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy in Thomasson agreed
with Judge Luttig signifies substantial confusion over the exact scope of the policy. See
Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 949 (Luttig, J., concurring). The Ninth Circuit in Meinhold v.
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rence argued that the regulations misled the judiciary' by allowing
admitted homosexuals to rebut the presumption of a "propensity" to
engage in homosexual conduct by providing "evidence relevant to
whether the member is likely to engage in homosexual acts., 312 Judge
Luttig, however, cited the congressional findings leading to the formulation of the policy as evidence that Congress intended
"propensity" to mean an "inclination" because it allowed a service
member to rebut the presumption by presenting "any other evidence
relevant to whether the member engages in, attempts to engage in,
has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual
acts." 3 According to Judge Luttig, the difference was more than
semantic; he claimed that the regulatory use of a "likelihood" standard would threaten unit cohesion by creating a "sanctuary" for
openly gay soldiers to remain in the military because it would be
easier to rebut the presumption of a "likelihood" than an
"inclination."314 Thus, the concurrence's sharp criticism of the Department of Defense's construction of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy centers around a concern that the policy's broad anti-gay scope
will be detrimentally 5narrowed by subjective interpretations of the
31
policy's terminology.
United States Department of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994), presented the first
notable recognition of the potential impact of the differing definitions of "propensity."
See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text (discussing the Meinhold court's treatment
of the policy's terms).
311. Compare Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 685-86 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (defining
"propensity" as a "likelihood"), with Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 460 (7th Cir.
1989) (applying the policy as if it intended "propensity" to be an "inclination").
312. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 941 (Luttig, J., concurring) (citing DOD Directive
1332.14, Enc. 3, Att. 1, 1 H.l.b.(2) (Mar. 4, 1994) (emphasis added)). In Holmes v. California Army National Guard, 920 F. Supp. 1510 (N.D. Cal. 1996), the court highlighted
the discrepancy between the statement in the regulations that homosexual orientation
would not interfere with service and the fact that a soldier would be discharged for revealing a homosexual orientation by saying "I am gay." See id. at 1532. The court went
on to state: "This defies logic. The inherent incongruity between what the policy says and
what it does in practice is clear evidence that the policy as a whole lacks any semblance of
rationality." Id.
313. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 937 (Luttig, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also 10
U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (1994) ("statements" provision of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy).
Judge Luttig also referred to various dictionary definitions of "propensity." See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 942 (Luttig, J., concurring); see also Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1479 (citing the
dictionary definition of "propensity" as the primary authority on the correct meaning of
the term).
314. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 943 (Luttig, J.,
concurring). Judge Luttig believed that
Congress intended merely to refrain from asking incoming recruits about their homosexual status, not to allow admitted homosexuals to stay in the force. See id.(Luttig, J.,
concurring).
315. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 943 (Luttig, J.,
concurring).

1997]

"DON'TASK, DON'T TELL"

1021

While Judge Luttig effectively conveyed a need to clarify the
policy, his allegation that the regulations undermine the effectiveness
of the policy are contrary to the majority of decisions, in addition to
being highly controversial. 316 Several courts have adopted the regulatory definition of "propensity," and yet have still upheld the
discharge of gay soldiers, thereby negating Judge Luttig's concern
that proclaimed homosexuals would be increasingly allowed to remain in the military under the regulations. 317 For example, in Watson,
the court applied the "concrete intentions" standard of the Ninth
Circuit,3 8 which parallels the "likelihood" standard, but nonetheless
upheld the soldier's discharge for announcing he was gay.319 Judge
Luttig also failed to recognize that the Thorne court only refrained
from striking down the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy as unconstitutional because of the mitigating effect of the regulations on the
statute's overly broad scope.
In a subsequent case, Able v. United States,321the Second Circuit
has criticized Judge Luttig's argument against the regulatory definition of "propensity."' After analyzing the constitutional challenges
to the policy under the "likelihood" standard, 323 the Able court turned
316. See, e.g., Thorne v. United States Dep't of Defense, 916 F. Supp. 1358, 1366 (E.D.
Va. 1996) (finding it necessary to read the regulations with the statute in order to uphold
the policy), opinion supplemented by 945 F. Supp. 924,926 (E.D. Va. 1996) (mem.).
317. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 941-42 (Luttig, J.,
concurring) ("[Tjhe statutory term
'propensity,' [has] created what is in effect a sanctuary for known homosexuals whom the
military determines are not likely to engage in homosexual acts.").
318. See Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1479 (9th Cir.
1994); Watson v. Perry, 918 F. Supp. 1403, 1414 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (applying the
"concrete intent" standard of Meinhold); see also supra notes 89-93, 185-92 and accompanying text (discussing Meinhold and Watson in greater detail). Judge Hall advocated a
similar approach, stating that the military should only be allowed to suppress speech if
such restrictions are connected to a fundamental factor of military effectiveness. See
Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 954 (Hall, J., dissenting).
319. See Watson, 918 F. Supp. at 1414-15.
320. See Thorne, 916 F. Supp. at 1364-68. The Thorne court found that the statute
intended "propensity" to mean an abstract "inclination," while the regulations limited the
scope of the policy by defining it as a "likelihood." See id. at 1366.
321. 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996). The Second Circuit rejected the district court's reasons for holding the statute unconstitutional under the First Amendment and remanded
the case for the lower court's renewed consideration. See id&at 1300.
322. See id. at 1298-99.
323. See id. at 1296-97. The suit was brought by several gays and lesbians whom the
military had dismissed under the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. Unlike the majority of
litigation over the policy, these plaintiffs attacked the constitutionality of the conduct
provision, 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1) (1994). However, because their claim relied on the validity of the statements provision, § 654(b)(2), for purposes of standing, the Second
Circuit considered both sections of the statute. See Able, 88 F.3d at 1284. The court rejected the lower court's invalidation of the statements provision and remanded the case.
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its attention to Judge Luttig's allegations regarding the scope of
"propensity. 324 The Second Circuit closely examined § 654 and
found that "[a]ll three grounds [(b)(1)-(3)] for discharge are anchored in the need for a homosexual act, or at least the likelihood of
such an act, before the member can be discharged," and that the
"only evidence to the contrary is the use of the word 'propensity' in
§ 654(b)(2), which Judge Luttig... construed to mean an
'inclination.' ,325 While the Second Circuit recognized some merit to
the argument that Congress intended the latter definition, it cited
Congress's failure to specifically define "propensity" as substantial
evidence that "likelihood" is the correct definition.3 2' The Able court
also found support for the regulatory meaning in the text of the statute.327 First, because both § 654(b)(1) and (3) base the discharge on
actions, the court reasoned that (b)(2) also required more than a
mere orientation or "inclination., 3 The court also noted that none
of the fifteen reasons enumerated in § 654(a) mention the word
"orientation"; they only mention "conduct.',329 Consequently, the
Able court interpreted the legislature's replacement of "desire" in the
1981 policy with "propensity" in the 1994 policy to suggest "that
Congress intended to move away from the emphasis on homosexual
orientation under the former policy and to substitute an act-based
policy in its place. 330 Thus, Judge Luttig's contention that the regulaSee id.
324. See Able, 88 F.3d at 1298-99. The court based its decision to uphold the policy on
the "likelihood" definition, stating that "given the rational connection between the statement 'I am a homosexual' and the likelihood that the declarant will commit homosexual
acts, § 654(b)(2) is no more restrictive than necessary." Id.at 1296.
325. Id. at 1298 (emphasis added). The court addressed Judge Luttig's argument because the Family Research Council had cited Judge Luttig as support for its contention in
an amicus brief that the "statute bars all those who are known to have a homosexual orientation." Id.
326. See id; see Krygowski, supra note 7, at 911-24 (discussing the scope of the term).
The Second Circuit did state, however, that "[i]f Congress's intent to exclude persons
solely on the basis of their homosexual orientation was clear, we would be required to
construe the Act in that manner." Able, 88 F.3d at 1299. This, however, would undoubtedly raise issues of status-based discrimination and prejudice.
327. See Able, 88 F.3d at 1298-99.
328. See id at 1299; see also supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (stating the
terms of each category under which the military can discharge a homosexual soldier).
329. See Able, 88 F.3d at 1299; see also supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text
(discussing how the Cammermeyer court rejected some of Congress's fifteen stated motivations behind the policy).
330. Able, 88 F.3d at 1299. But see Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 944 (Luttig, J.,
concurring)
(stating that Congress did not intend for the change in terms to materially affect the scope
of the statute (citing S. REP.No. 103-112, at 289-90 (1993))). The fact that the Second
Circuit devoted a substantial portion of its opinion to expressly criticizing the Thomasson
concurrence, even though it is not binding on the Second Circuit, implies that Judge Lut-
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tions should be omitted from the policy is not only at odds with past
decisions, but also has been attacked in subsequent opinions.
While his proposition of upholding only the statutory interpretation of the policy is controversial at a minimum, Judge Luttig's
solution to the problem is, at best, impracticable. Rather than suggesting a more moderate solution for revising the scope of the
regulations, he advocated "invalidat[ing] the Administration's regulation as in excess of its statutory authority," so as to leave the
statutory definition of "inclination" as controlling.331 However, to
pursue this approach would undermine every argument made by the
Thomasson majority, as well as by the majority of courts, that the judiciary must respect the separation of powers, particularly in a
military context.33 While the judiciary serves as a check on the other
branches, Judge Luttig's proposal to eliminate the regulations created by another branch appears to cross the line of acceptable judicial
regulation of the executive branch, and certainly defies the conservative sentiments of the majority to maintain a minimal role in military
333
Second, Judge Luttig's plan is directly contrary to what
matters.
the judiciary perceives as its function-to determine if the military's
policies are constitutional. 334 Though it is within the purview of the
judiciary to reconcile discrepancies between statutes and their implementing regulations, it is preferrable for such discrepancies to be
remedied by the politically accountable branches of government.335
Finally, Judge Luttig's argument that the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy should be operated strictly under the statutory definition of
fig's argument is at least radical enough to evoke a heated response from other courts.
331. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 934 (Luttig, J.,concurring). Judge Luttig analyzed
Thomasson's equal protection claim and concurred with the majority's holding that Thomasson's discharge was rational. See id at 947-49.
332. The Framers of the Constitution specifically created the three branches of government in an effort to prevent one branch from usurping the powers of another, thus
avoiding oppression by any one branch. See THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 338-43 (James
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
333. Furthermore, many courts, including the Supreme Court, have cited the Constitution as the fundamental basis for their position that the judiciary should defer to the
legislative and executive branches on military matters since the Constitution specifically
grants military powers to these branches and not to the judiciary. See supra note 113 and
accompanying text.
334. See Watson v. Perry, 918 F. Supp. 1403, 1411 (W.D. Wash. 1996) ("The policy
must be upheld so long as it is constitutional." (emphasis added)); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (aiming to "provide
some practical security for each [branch] against the invasion of the others").
335. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 465-66 & n.9 (7th Cir. 1989). The Thomasson majority supported this very principle when it noted that "[a]ny argument that
Congress was misguided in this view is one of legislative policy, not constitutional law."
Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 929.
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"propensity" in order to preserve Congress's intent is contrary to that
very intent. The statute promulgated by Congress clearly mandates
that "[a] member of the armed forces shall be separated from the
armed forces under regulationsprescribed by the Secretary of Defense
if one or more of the following findings is made and approved in ac336
cordance with the procedures set forth in such regulations."
Therefore, the statute suggests that Congress had every intention of
giving the Department of Defense wide discretion in implementing
the policy. Consequently, while Judge Luttig's concerns over the discrepancies between the regulations and the statute appear genuine,
his solution is overly broad, impracticable, and potentially unconstitutional.
Though not nearly as controversial as the concurrence, Judge
Hall, in dissent, also challenged the majority's deferential endorsement of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, casting a different light
on the debate by focusing on whether the policy is in fact founded on
prejudice.337 Judge Hall conducted an investigation into the basis for
the policy that was reminiscent of Cammenneyer,38 dismissing the
government's arguments that homosexuals jeopardize unit cohesion339 and the bonds of trustm as contrary to both empirical fact and
common sense. Legal commentators have similarly concluded that
336. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1994) (emphasis added). The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia stated that it only upheld the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy under the First Amendment because it construed the statute with the regulations.
See Thorne v. United States Dep't of Defense, 916 F. Supp. 1358, 1366 (E.D. Va. 1996),
opinionsupplemented by 945 F. Supp. 924,926 (E.D. Va. 1996) (mem.).
337. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 950-51 (Hall, J., dissenting). Judge Hall began his
dissent by criticizing the majority's overwhelming deference to the military, stating that it
had shirked its duty of "ensuring that the military remains submissive to the Constitution
and civil authority." Id.at 949 (Hall, J., dissenting).
338. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text (outlining how the district court in
Cammerneyerarrived at the conclusion that the policy was based on prejudice and, thus,
was unconstitutional).
339. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 951-52 (Hall, J., dissenting). Judge Hall cited empirical evidence such as the RAND report used in Cammermeyer that contradicted the
military's allegation that gays and lesbians harmed unit cohesion. See id. at 952 (Hall, J.,
dissenting); see also Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 922-23 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(citing the RAND report, as well as other statistics, as support that the presence of openly
gay and lesbian soldiers does not threaten unit cohesion), appeal dismissed as moot and
remanded,97 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1996).
340. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 953 (Hall, J.,dissenting). The dissent found completely illogical the theory that ousting proclaimed gays furthers trust, since the
alternative to announcing one's sexuality is to keep it secret, and "[c]ommon sense suggests that a policy of secrecy, indeed what might be called a policy of deception or
dishonesty, will call unit cohesion into question." Id.(citing Able v. United States, 880 F.
Supp. 968, 979 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996)).

1997]

"DON'TASK, DON'T TELL"

1025

the policy is founded on the irrational prejudices of the military and,
therefore, should be invalidated as unconstitutional. 34' Even courts
that find no constitutional violations in the discharge of gay and lesbian soldiers have agreed that there is a definite prejudicial
undertone to the policy.342 Yet the fact that the policy is continually
upheld indicates that the interests of the government in maintaining
an effective military force outweighs the prejudice of such a policy,
and will probably continue to do so until the homophobic concerns of
the armed forces are put to rest.343 Thus, Judge Hall's claim that the
policy is prejudicial may very well be accurate, but may still have little impact on the outcome of most cases under the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy.
Though it is within the majority's judicial discretion to uphold
the policy in the name of judicial deference, the arguments against
the majority's opinion remain largely unrefuted. The central question is whether it was prudent for the majority to have ignored the
various stances on the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. By proclaiming its strict adherence to separation of powers in military issues, the
Fourth Circuit may have unintentionally tied its hands with respect to
all military matters. The court will undoubtedly face military claims
in the future where it may wish to take on an active role for public
policy reasons. After the Thomasson decision, however, the court
may find that it has unwittingly restricted its role in military matters.
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit may not have been wise to so
broadly endorse judicial deference to the military in light of potential
future repercussions.
By isolating itself from the numerous controversies surrounding
341. See, e.g., VanderHeide, supra note 74, at 1306-07 (arguing that the policy is based
on prejudice and proposing a constitutional interpretation of the terms of the policy).
342. See Watson v. Perry, 918 F. Supp. 1403, 1411 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (conceding that
"many other servicemembers would like to see homosexuals ousted merely because of
their sexual preference"); cf. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 465 (7th Cir. 1989)
("Homosexuals have suffered a history of discrimination and still do, though possibly now
in less degree."). A number of military commanders and officials have agreed that policies against homosexuals are largely motivated by personal fears of gays and lesbians. See
Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 951 (Hall, J., dissenting) (citing Assistant Secretary of Defense
Edwin Dom and Lt. General John Otjen); see also id (Hall, J., dissenting) (noting the

belief of one retired Admiral that "homosexuals engage in 'a filthy, disease-ridden practice' [and] are 'inherently promiscuous' " (quoting Retired Admiral Thomas Moorer)).
343. In the name of national security, the judiciary has previously upheld military policies that were clearly discriminatory. For example, in Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944), the Supreme Court held that it was permissible for the military to place

Japanese-Americans in internment camps due to security concerns in time of war, stating
that everyone must bear hardships during war and implying that discrimination was the
hardship to be born by Korematsu. See id. at 219-20.
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the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, the Fourth Circuit also may have
inaccurately interpreted the position of gays in the military. In addition to yielding an interesting debate, the conflicting interpretations
of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy may indicate that some courts
are gravitating toward granting homosexuals specialized recognition
under the Constitution. The most notable sign of such a movement
came from the United States Supreme Court in its recent decision of
Romer v. Evans.3" In Romer, the Supreme Court struck down a
Colorado constitutional amendment that specifically prohibited homosexuals from invoking protection from discrimination, holding
that the amendment failed to satisfy rational basis scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 34s While the
Court maintained that consensual homosexuality is not a fundamental right and homosexuals are not a suspect class, thereby warranting
only rational review, the Court appeared to actively apply the standard, thus increasing the burden on the state." Consequently, the
Court deemed the asserted governmental ends to be illegitimate,
concluding that "[tihe breadth of the Amendment is so far removed
from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit
them."'347 The fact that homosexuals triumphed even under the most
deferential standard of review in Romer may foreshadow a judicial
movement toward granting increased constitutional protection,
through heightened scrutiny, to gays and lesbians in civilian society. m
344. 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996).
345. See id.at 1629. The Court stated that the amendment was "at once too narrow
and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection
across the board." Id.at 1628.
346. See id. at 1627-29; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword- Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. Rtlv.4, 77-78 (1996) (grouping Romer in a line of cases, including
Cleburne, that have employed "rationality review 'with bite' when prejudice and hostility
are especially likely to be present"); Teresa M. Bruce, Note, Doing the Nasty: An Argument for Bringing Same-Sex Erotic Conduct Back into the Courtroom, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 1135, 1178 (1996) (stating that the Supreme Court in Romer used "rational basis
review with a 'bite' "); cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
442-50 (1985) (applying rational basis review to strike down legislation classifying mentally retarded individuals for the purpose of obtaining housing permits).
347. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
348. See Sunstein, supra note 346, at 77 ("Romer suggests that rationality review will
not always result in validation...."); Steven A. Delchin, Comment, Scalia 18:22: Thou
Shall Not Lie with the Academic and Law School Elite; It is an Abomination-Romer v.
Evans and America's Culture War, 47 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 207, 215-16 (1996) (noting
that Romer has been cited as a major victory for homosexuals). Some commentators
have predicted that Romer could be to homosexuality what Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971), was to gender-the Supreme Court "case that ushered in the era of heightened
scrutiny." Tobias Barrington Wolff, Case Note, PrincipledSilence: Romer v. Evans, 116
S. Ct. 1620 (1996), 106 YALE L.J. 247,250-51 (1996); accordDelchin, supra,at 231-32; see
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While deference to the military continues to weigh heavily in judicial decisions, the Supreme Court's active review of gay issues in
the civilian world under Romer may one day translate into the military arena, potentially changing the outcome of cases like Thomasson
under the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. At a minimum, the Fourth
Circuit's strict adherence to the most deferential standard of review
in the context of homosexuals in the military exists in some tension
with the Supreme Court's apparent movement toward granting homosexual claims a more active version of rational basis review. Had
the Thomasson court concentrated more on the judicial debate between the circuits and the lower courts, perhaps it would have
recognized that these debates may be signaling a shift in position of
the Supreme Court on issues implicating gay and lesbian rights.
Despite the potential effects of Romer, the future of gay and lesbian soldiers under the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy will continue
to be uncertain until the Supreme Court directly addresses the scope
of the policy. The Court recently declined an invitation to do just
that when it denied certiorari in Thomasson.349 The Thomasson decision would have provided the Court with an opportunity to introduce
increased judicial activism in homosexual rights into the military.
Moreover, the Court could have imposed some degree of uniformity
and consistency on judicial decisions under the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy.3 0
However, despite the benefits a controlling decision would acalso Reed, 404 U.S. at 76-77 (finding a gender-based classification to violate the Equal
Protection Clause under rational basis review).
349. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert denied, 117 S.Ct.
358 (1996). It appears that the situation for gays and lesbians in the military may be getting worse, instead of better, under the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. In Hawaii, the
military is allegedly conducting a "witch hunt" for gay and lesbian soldiers by initiating
investigations into soldiers who appear at gay bars and by seeking membership lists for
gay churches. See Katia Hetter, Is the Air Force Asking and Telling? Gays Allege a Witch
Hunt at a HawaiianBase, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 2, 1996, at 34, 34; see also
Philip Shenon, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Policy Under Fire; Military Hasn't Stemmed Investigation of Homosexuals, Documents Show, L.A. DAILY NEws, Mar. 3, 1996, at N21
("RIhe military is not only continuing to ask some troops about their sexual orientation,
but is also asking their parents, their friends and their therapists.").
350. The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari received widespread media attention.
See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Survives Challenge: Supreme Court
Elects Not to HearAppeal of Military Gay Policy,BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 22, 1996, at 1A;
Jan Crawford Greenburg, Supreme Court Won't Hear Gays-In-MilitaryCase: "Don'tAsk
Don't Tell" Policy Survives First Challenge, CI. TRIB., Oct. 22, 1996, at 4; Tony Mauro,
Court Avoids Military Gays Case, USA TODAY, Oct. 22, 1996, at 1A; David G. Savage,
High Court Delays Final Ruling on Gays, Military: Justices Reject Challenge to Policy of
Excluding Homosexuals. Decision Leaves the Door Open for Broader Cases, Observers
Say, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1996, at A13.
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cord to the lower courts, and perhaps to gay and lesbian soldiers, the
Court's decision to deny certiorari was not entirely surprising. 3s'
Homosexuality remains one of the most controversial issues in civilian society, and it is likely the Court is waiting until a clearer social
32
consensus emerges before overstepping the military judgment.
Furthermore, the fact that President Clinton was responsible for the
evolution of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy illustrates that military policies are vulnerable to the changing political powers 5 3 and,
therefore, the democratic electoral process may constitute a sufficient
check on the military's homosexual policies 3 Finally, the tradition
of judicial deference toward the military may be too rooted in
American jurisprudence to allow the Court to further invade the insulated society of the armed forces.
Whatever the Court's rationale, it is clear that homosexual soldiers continue to face an uncertain future in the military as the lower
courts continue to issue conflicting interpretations of permissible gay
actions under the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy.3 5 The Fourth Cir351. See Tony Mauro, Gays-MilitaryIssue Not Yet "Ripe" Enough, USA TODAY, Oct.
22, 1996, at A3 ("[T]he justices' rationale in rejecting the case most likely has more to do
with the way the court operates than with the merits of Thomasson's case or the issue
itself.").
352. Justice Scalia sharply criticized the Romer majority's involvement in this highly
debated issue, stating: "I think it no business of the courts (as opposed to the political
branches) to take sides in this culture war." Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). One of the reasons cited by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter in Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), for refusing to overturn Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), was that society had not yet reached a sufficient consensus on abortion issues
so as to warrant judicial intervention. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 863-64. It is clear that the
public similarly has not reached a consensus on the acceptability of homosexuals in the
military. Compare Michael Kramer, Don't Settle for Hypocrisy, TIME, July 26, 1993, at
41, 41 (arguing that "'Don't ask, don't tell' shouldn't work because it is morally reprehensible") and Michelle Stevens, Nobody's Business, CH. SuN-TIMES, Aug. 19, 1996, at
27 (finding the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy to be a "discriminatory policy"), with Ross
Mackenzie, A Barrage of Questions About Homosexuals in the Nation's Military,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 10, 1995, at F7 (homosexuals should not be allowed
in the military, as "[tihere is no doubt, and there can be none, that homosexuality does
not conduce to good military order").
353. Senator Bob Dole indicated that, if elected, he would have opposed the "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy based on conservative views that homosexuals do not belong in
the military. See Rowan Scarborough, Republican Hopefuls' Views on Military Stick to
Tradition, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 12,1996, at A4.
354. Like the Thomasson court, the Supreme Court may also have decided the issue
should be controlled by the political dynamics of the legislative and executive branches,
thereby allowing it to bow out of the debate in the name of separation of powers. Cf.
Romer, 116 S.Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Striking [Colorado's amendment refusing to extend protection to gays and lesbians] down is an act, not of judicial judgment,
but of political will.").
355. The military often transfers soldiers to new bases across America. A lack of uni-
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cuit's decision in Thomasson may be the most ominous decision yet
for homosexuals, as its strict adherence to separation of powers and
judicial deference to the military may be one step toward relieving
the military of significant constitutional restrictions, thereby threatening the integrity of the Constitution. One has to wonder if there is
not some truth to Judge Hall's warning that "a broad 'military exception' from the Constitution in the interest of defending us from
foreign6 danger could transform the military into a domestic danger.,35
ALICIA CHRISTINA ALMEIDA

formity creates yet another issue for gays and lesbians in the armed forces: what will
happen to their careers if they declare their homosexuality in a jurisdiction that will tolerate open gays under the policy, but are transferred to a base in a jurisdiction that excludes
open gays under the policy? The fact that soldiers face such transfers makes the need for
a uniform interpretation particularly compelling.
356. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 949 (Hall, J., dissenting).

